Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Hembree was previously convicted in Mississippi state court in 2018 for simple possession of methamphetamine, a felony offense. In 2022, he was indicted under federal law for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hembree moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that applying § 922(g)(1) to him violated the Second Amendment, particularly in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, after which Hembree entered a guilty plea under an agreement that reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. He was sentenced to six months in prison and three years of supervised release.After sentencing, Hembree appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, preserving only his as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). He argued that there was no historical tradition justifying the disarmament of individuals based solely on a conviction for simple drug possession. The government contended that historical analogues, such as laws disarming dangerous persons or severely punishing possession of contraband, supported the statute’s application to Hembree’s circumstances.The Fifth Circuit held that the government failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of individuals convicted only of simple drug possession. The court concluded that neither the tradition of punishing possession of contraband nor the disarmament of “dangerous persons” provided a sufficient analogue for Hembree’s predicate offense. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Hembree and reversed his conviction. The court did not address Hembree’s additional constitutional claims, as resolution of the as-applied challenge was dispositive. The court also granted Hembree’s motion to supplement the record. View "United States v. Hembree" on Justia Law

The respondent was charged with aggravated robbery, menacing, and criminal mischief after engaging in erratic and violent behavior in Denver. According to his own testimony, earlier that evening he had consumed beer and accepted a marijuana joint from an acquaintance whose name he did not know. After smoking the joint, he began feeling paranoid and eventually blacked out, recalling nothing until after the events in question. During the trial, the respondent claimed that the joint contained an unknown substance, such as a stimulant, which caused his behavior, and he requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.The Denver District Court denied the request for an involuntary intoxication instruction, finding the claim speculative, and a jury convicted the respondent on all counts. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutory defense of involuntary intoxication is legally available when a defendant knowingly ingests what he believes to be a particular intoxicant, but unknowingly ingests a different intoxicant, and it is the unknown substance that deprives him of the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The appellate court concluded that this was the essence of the respondent’s claim and that he was entitled to the jury instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that, under Colorado law, when a defendant ingests a product containing multiple intoxicants, the relevant “substance” for purposes of the involuntary intoxication defense is the entire product—not each particular component. Because the respondent knowingly smoked a joint he knew or should have known was intoxicating, his intoxication was deemed self-induced, barring the involuntary intoxication defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Mion" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was serving a term of supervised release following a federal conviction for fentanyl-related offenses. During his supervision, police responded to a domestic disturbance at his apartment, where his wife reported that, after an argument, the defendant struck her and was told to leave. When she locked him out, she stated that he kicked the apartment door, damaging it, re-entered, and took her cell phone. Police and a responding officer documented the damage to the door. The defendant was subsequently charged in state court with vandalism, among other offenses, and federal probation officers sought revocation of his supervised release based on these new alleged criminal acts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held revocation hearings, during which both documentary evidence, such as police reports and affidavits, and live testimony from the responding officer were presented. The defendant objected to the admission of hearsay statements from his wife, arguing he was entitled to confront her and that the statements were unreliable. The district court found that the interest of justice did not require her appearance, determined her statements were sufficiently reliable, and credited the corroborating testimony of the police officer. The court concluded that the defendant had, by a preponderance of the evidence, committed vandalism under Massachusetts law and revoked his supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that the district court properly admitted the hearsay evidence, conducted the required balancing under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C), and made supported findings regarding the elements of vandalism. The appellate court concluded there was neither legal error nor clear error and affirmed the revocation of supervised release. View "United States v. Camillo" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted under federal law for possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The predicate offense was a 2010 conviction under Maine law for simple assault against his then-wife, to which he pleaded no contest after the original charge of "Domestic Violence Assault" was reduced. Several years later, he was charged federally after he admitted to police that he owned a firearm. At his federal trial, he stipulated to many elements of the offense but sought to introduce evidence that he believed, based on his plea arrangement and representations by the prosecution and his attorney in state court, that he was legally allowed to possess a firearm.Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Maine convicted him, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that conviction after the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which clarified the knowledge requirement for firearms offenses. On remand, he was retried and again convicted, but a First Circuit panel vacated the conviction due to errors in jury instructions. Sitting en banc, the First Circuit clarified the applicable knowledge standard, vacated the conviction, and remanded for another trial. On further remand, the District Court denied his Second Amendment challenge to the statute, excluded his proffered evidence regarding his belief about firearm possession, and again convicted him after a jury trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied, in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in United States v. Rahimi. The court also held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the defendant’s belief about the lawfulness of his conduct, as the statute does not require knowledge that firearm possession is unlawful, only knowledge of the facts that make one ineligible. The conviction and denial of the motion to dismiss were affirmed. View "US v. Minor" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old child, J.F., died from malnutrition and an infection caused by untreated head lice while living in a house on the Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota. The home was shared by Sharon Rosebear, her husband, their son Derrick’s five children, and, starting in 2021, her son Julius and his five children, including J.F. The house lacked running water, but free showers and medical care were available nearby. Rosebear regularly provided food for Derrick’s children but not for Julius’s, including J.F., who was often kept home from school due to chronic head lice. In the days before J.F.’s death, Julius left his children in Rosebear’s care, and she acknowledged being responsible for them during that time. J.F. ultimately died on December 25, 2022. The autopsy revealed severe malnutrition and a prolonged lice infestation.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over Rosebear’s trial. The jury found her guilty of felony child neglect under the Major Crimes Act, which incorporates applicable Minnesota law. The district court denied Rosebear’s motion for acquittal or a new trial and sentenced her to 15 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Rosebear argued both that the evidence was insufficient to prove she was J.F.’s caretaker and that her sentence exceeded the state’s mandatory maximum under Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines, in violation of the Major Crimes Act and Supreme Court precedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Rosebear was J.F.’s caretaker and had willfully deprived her of food and medical care. The court also held that the Major Crimes Act requires sentencing within the statutory minimum and maximum penalties set by state law, but not adherence to state sentencing guidelines; instead, the federal sentencing guidelines apply, as long as the sentence does not exceed the state statute’s maximum. View "United States v. Rosebear" on Justia Law

A man was charged with drug offenses after his car was stopped by police officers in Hagerstown, Maryland. The officers initiated the stop after observing the driver manipulating or pressing the screen of a cell phone mounted to the vehicle’s windshield while the car was in motion. The officers did not provide further details about the driver’s conduct beyond noting these interactions with the phone. The driver was not charged with a mobile phone or texting violation, but he moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that the stop itself was unlawful.The Circuit Court for Washington County denied the suppression motion, holding that simply seeing someone manipulate a phone while driving constituted reasonable articulable suspicion of a mobile phone violation, since the conduct could easily be texting. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of fentanyl possession and related charges. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, finding that the officers’ observations were of innocuous conduct and did not provide reasonable suspicion of illegal activity under Maryland’s statutes governing mobile phone use while driving.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision. The Court held that when an officer observes conduct consistent with both lawful and unlawful mobile phone use, the Fourth Amendment requires the officer to identify specific, articulable facts which, together with rational inferences, reasonably indicate a violation of the relevant statutes. Merely seeing a driver manipulate, touch, or press a phone screen, without more, is insufficient to justify a traffic stop. The Court thus concluded that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the evidence should have been suppressed. View "State v. Stone" on Justia Law

Law enforcement uncovered a large-scale fentanyl distribution conspiracy involving multiple individuals transporting fentanyl pills from Phoenix, Arizona, to the Twin Cities. The conspirators concealed pills inside stuffed animals and shipped them as birthday gifts, taking measures to evade detection. Da’Shawn Domena participated by coordinating, receiving, and delivering packages he knew contained fentanyl. Police intercepted some packages, but others were shipped undetected. A search of Domena’s apartment revealed fentanyl pills and other evidence linking him to the conspiracy. Domena admitted his involvement, specifically acknowledging the receipt and distribution of multiple packages containing fentanyl.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota accepted Domena’s guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, an offense carrying a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Despite being eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which could have avoided the mandatory minimum, Domena chose not to cooperate with the government. The Presentence Investigation Report found him responsible for 30.8 kilograms of fentanyl and calculated a lower guidelines range, but the statutory minimum controlled. At sentencing, Domena argued that the mandatory minimum violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, citing his minor role, lack of criminal history, absence of violence, and personal struggles. The district court rejected this argument, referencing existing Eighth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Domena’s Eighth Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that the mandatory minimum sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court emphasized that circuit precedent consistently upholds mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses and found Domena’s arguments unpersuasive. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "United States v. Domena" on Justia Law

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, an individual orchestrated a scheme to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE), specifically masks, using investor funds. The purpose was to resell these materials at a markup, capitalizing on shortages and increased demand. The defendant managed the financial transactions, facilitated agreements with buyers (including an undercover FBI agent), and arranged for proceeds to be distributed among the participants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Defense Production Act by accumulating designated scarce materials for resale above prevailing market prices. The defendant objected to the jury instruction defining "accumulate," arguing it should mean "to gather, collect, or accrue over a period of time," and moved to dismiss the charges on grounds of statutory vagueness, but the Magistrate Judge denied these motions. Upon appeal, the District Judge affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was unambiguous and that "accumulate" did not require a temporal element.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the term "accumulate" as used in Section 4512 of the Defense Production Act requires the government to prove that accumulation occurred over a period of time or involved withholding materials from the market. The court held that "accumulate" must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning—“to gather, collect, or accrue”—and does not require a prolonged period or withholding. The statutory text was found unambiguous, and the court rejected the defendant’s proposed interpretation and vagueness challenge. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Bulloch" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted along with several co-defendants for the murder of Kisasi Baltrip and related offenses following a grand jury proceeding in 2007. The charges included first-degree murder, conspiracy, discharge of a firearm, and gang participation, with various enhancements. The defendant later pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and other charges as part of a plea agreement, admitting to a firearm enhancement. The factual basis for the plea was stipulated to be found in police reports and grand jury testimony. He was sentenced to 15 years to life plus additional terms for the enhancements and related offenses, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal after a modification to custody credits.Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides relief to certain individuals convicted of murder under theories that have since been restricted by legislative reform. The Superior Court of Kern County initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for a further hearing. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and admitted the grand jury transcript, police reports, witness statements, and other law enforcement documents over defense objection, relying on these materials to deny the petition on the basis that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that neither the grand jury transcript nor the law enforcement-generated documents were admissible at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing under the governing statutory exception for evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial.” The court vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, permitting the prosecution the opportunity to present admissible evidence. The holding was not that the petition should be granted outright, but rather that a new hearing must be held applying proper evidentiary standards. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in Maryland state court for the attempted murder of his girlfriend, who was shot in her apartment. The prosecution presented evidence including a homemade device that appeared to be a silencer and DNA evidence tying the defendant to that device. Witnesses testified about the defendant’s involvement in preparing the device and his motive, which stemmed from the girlfriend’s pregnancy and her threat to seek child support. Additional evidence linked the defendant to the type of firearm used in the shooting. The jury found the defendant guilty as an accessory before the fact, and he was sentenced to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the defendant sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing that the prosecution failed to disclose a forensic report about a laptop, which could have impeached a key witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s online activity. The state postconviction court granted a new trial, but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the undisclosed evidence was not material because the other evidence linking the defendant to the crime was strong enough that there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied review.The defendant then sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court granted his petition, and a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the state court had not properly applied the correct standard for materiality under Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the state appellate court correctly applied the materiality standard and that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to reasonable state court decisions. The Supreme Court found that a fairminded jurist could conclude the withheld evidence was not material, and therefore federal habeas relief was not warranted. View "Klein v. Martin" on Justia Law