Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man faced criminal charges stemming from two separate incidents: one in San Diego in August 2020, where he struck a taxi driver with a skateboard during what appeared to be a psychotic episode, and another in Newport Beach in March 2022, where he damaged property at a car dealership and stole a yacht, causing injury and property damage. After the first incident, he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and granted pretrial mental health diversion, but this was revoked following the second incident. After the Newport Beach offense, he was diagnosed by another expert with bipolar disorder and related conditions, with evidence suggesting he had been misdiagnosed and improperly medicated prior to the second incident.The Superior Court of Orange County considered his motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by expert reports stating his mental health conditions contributed to the offenses and that he would likely respond to treatment without posing an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community. The prosecution opposed, arguing prior diversion had failed and that he posed a danger. The trial court denied the motion, finding him eligible but not suitable for diversion due to doubts about his responsiveness to treatment and concerns about danger to public safety, relying in part on his history of declining treatment and the circumstances of the offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the lower court had abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard regarding responsiveness to treatment by disregarding the uncontradicted opinion of a qualified mental health expert. It also found the trial court’s determination that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying diversion and to reconsider the motion consistent with the proper legal standards. View "Siam v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, a business owner discovered that his yard’s fence had been cut, a lock removed, and a distinctive skid steer tractor missing. Months later, a law enforcement officer familiar with the stolen tractor observed a similar machine at the defendant’s scrapyard. Upon inspection, the tractor showed signs of tampering, including a removed serial number plate, a recently spray-painted exterior, and a matching hidden serial number. The defendant initially claimed the tractor had been inherited from his late uncle and had always been black, but he later argued at trial that it was purchased from another individual named Franco, and that he had confused two similar tractors.The defendant was charged with felony theft in the District Court of Uinta County. At trial, he sought to introduce a document purporting to be a bill of sale for the tractor through a witness, Kyle Hartley, who testified to seeing the transaction occur. However, Hartley’s description of the document did not match the document offered—specifically, he recalled both parties signing, but the document lacked the defendant’s signature. The district court ruled that foundation for the document had not been established and excluded it unless further authentication was provided. As a result, the defendant testified solely to lay the foundation, and the document was admitted. The jury convicted the defendant, and he was sentenced to prison.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in requiring additional foundation for the bill of sale, effectively forcing him to testify. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as the witness’s testimony did not sufficiently authenticate the document due to discrepancies. The conviction and judgment were affirmed. View "Titmus v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In this case, an individual was charged and later convicted of multiple sexual offenses and assault after allegations involving his then-girlfriend’s eight-year-old granddaughter. The key evidence included a sexual assault forensic examination (SAFE) kit, from which DNA samples were collected. At trial, questions arose about the chain of custody for the kit, particularly because a perianal swab was included in the kit despite the nurse testifying she did not recall collecting it. The defense argued this discrepancy undermined the reliability and authenticity of the evidence, seeking to exclude the entire DNA report or, alternatively, to redact references to the disputed swab. The court admitted a redacted version of the report, and the jury found the defendant guilty on most counts.Following his conviction and unsuccessful direct appeal—where the Appellate Court of Maryland held that he had not preserved his chain of custody objection for appellate review—the defendant filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Howard County for a new trial under Maryland’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Criminal Procedure Article § 8-201. He contended that the DNA evidence was unreliable due to the alleged chain of custody defects. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the defendant’s claim was not cognizable under CP § 8-201 because he challenged the authenticity and admissibility of the DNA evidence, not the scientific reliability of the testing itself. The court explained that § 8-201 provides relief only for claims of scientific unreliability, not for chain-of-custody or evidentiary issues that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. The court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Tarpley v. State" on Justia Law

After receiving an anonymous tip, law enforcement in Mercer County, Kentucky, stopped Steven Fellmy, who was driving a silver Ford Mustang matching the tip’s description. The stop was based on observed traffic violations, including a non-illuminated license plate and failure to signal a turn. After backup arrived, Fellmy was asked to exit the vehicle. He declined consent for a search, so a trained drug dog was led around the car. The dog briefly jumped up onto the car door and partially sniffed through the open window, ultimately alerting officers to drugs. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine and heroin, leading to Fellmy’s arrest and charge for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed and denied Fellmy’s pretrial motion to suppress the drugs. The court found that officers lawfully ordered Fellmy out of the vehicle after a valid traffic stop and that the dog’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search because the officers did not encourage the dog to intrude into the car’s interior. The court also denied Fellmy’s motion in limine to exclude the drug evidence, ruling that concerns about authentication and chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and could be addressed during cross-examination. The drugs were admitted, and Fellmy was convicted by jury and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that ordering Fellmy out of the car after a valid stop was lawful and that the dog’s brief contact with the car did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search under prevailing legal standards. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug evidence or in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding the chain of custody. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Fellmy" on Justia Law

Christopher Singer, a previously convicted felon, was investigated in connection with a drive-by shooting in Oklahoma City. Police found spent and live ammunition in his possession, leading to federal charges for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Singer pleaded guilty to this charge. At sentencing, the United States Probation Office presented a report noting Singer’s three prior Oklahoma state convictions: two for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645, and one for robbery with a firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed Singer’s objections to the presentence investigation report. Singer argued that his prior convictions under § 645 should not be classified as categorical crimes of violence for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the statute could apply to assaults against unborn victims, which federal law does not include in its definitions of “crime of violence.” The district court, relying on prior Tenth Circuit precedent in United States v. Taylor, overruled Singer’s objection, determined the convictions qualified under both the Guidelines and ACCA, and sentenced Singer to 180 months, the mandatory minimum under ACCA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentencing determination de novo. The court concluded that Oklahoma’s § 645 does criminalize assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against unborn persons. Guided by its own precedent, notably United States v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit held that because federal law excludes crimes against unborn persons from its definition of “crime of violence,” Singer’s prior convictions under § 645 do not categorically qualify as such under the Guidelines or ACCA. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing decision and remanded for resentencing consistent with this ruling. View "United States v. Singer" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with multiple counts of child molestation sexual assault involving his biological daughter, referred to as Maria, who was fourteen years old at trial. The alleged incidents took place when Maria was around eleven and occurred during visits with her father, including one on a bus and another at her paternal grandmother’s residence. Maria did not immediately report the assaults due to fear and concern for her father but eventually disclosed them to a friend, a program instructor, and ultimately to medical professionals. At Hasbro Children’s Hospital and its Aubin Child Protection Center, Maria was evaluated physically and mentally, and she recounted the assaults to Dr. Barron, a specialist in child-abuse pediatrics.In the Providence County Superior Court, two counts were dismissed—one by the prosecution and one by the trial justice following a motion for acquittal. The jury found the defendant not guilty on one count and guilty on another, resulting in a life sentence. The defense’s pretrial motions sought to exclude Dr. Barron’s testimony, arguing that Maria’s statements to her were not made for medical diagnosis or treatment but for evidence collection. The trial justice allowed the testimony, finding it related to Maria’s diagnosis and treatment, especially given her mental health concerns and risk of self-harm.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether challenged hearsay statements made by Maria to Dr. Barron were properly admitted under Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The Court held that, except for one preserved objection, the defendant had waived the hearsay objections by failing to renew them at trial. The Court further concluded that the admitted statement was pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment and, even if it were not, its admission was harmless as it was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Cable" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a homeowner during a burglary in 1985. The prosecution established that the defendant entered the victim’s home, stole property, and shot the victim in the back as he was fleeing. The case against the defendant was supported by fingerprint evidence, eyewitnesses, and testimony about his actions and statements before and after the crime. At trial, the defense argued alternative theories, including that another individual was the actual killer and that the shooting lacked intent. During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s prior felonies, while the defense offered extensive mitigating evidence regarding his abusive childhood and mental health issues.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The defendant subsequently filed state and federal habeas petitions, raising claims about his competency to stand trial, the effectiveness of his counsel, and alleged jury coercion. The California Supreme Court summarily denied these claims, and the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied his federal habeas petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the deferential standard required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded the evidence did not sufficiently support the defendant’s claims of incompetence or ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit also found no basis to conclude the trial court coerced the jury’s verdict or that California’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Beeler v. Broomfield" on Justia Law

A man engaged in sexually explicit exchanges with a 13-to-14-year-old girl, during which he solicited and received images and videos depicting the minor’s genitalia and acts of self-penetration with a sex toy. His communications included explicit language suggesting rough and anal sex and requesting increasingly graphic content. After he received sexually explicit media from the minor, he was arrested and charged with several offenses, including sexual exploitation of a minor, receipt and possession of child pornography, and transfer of obscene material to a minor. He ultimately pled guilty to the receipt of child pornography.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa applied a four-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)(A), reasoning that the material he received depicted sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence, specifically the minor’s self-penetration with a foreign object. The court sentenced him to 240 months in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that the enhancement did not apply because the victim was not prepubescent, used a sex toy rather than another object, and appeared to experience sexual pleasure rather than pain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The appellate court held that, under its precedent including United States v. Starr, acts of self-penetration by a minor with a foreign object constitute "violence" under the guideline, regardless of the minor’s age, the type of object, or whether the minor experienced pain. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the four-level enhancement. View "United States v. Vannausdle" on Justia Law

Police investigating a sexual assault executed a search warrant at a mobile home occupied by three individuals, including the appellant. During the search of one resident’s bedroom, officers found a glass pipe believed to contain methamphetamine residue. The appellant and his mother, who also lived in the home, denied the presence of drugs when questioned. Based on the discovery, law enforcement obtained a second warrant to search the entire residence for controlled substances. This second search led to the discovery of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in a bench located in the appellant’s bedroom, resulting in his arrest and charge for felony possession.The District Court of Campbell County presided over the criminal case. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer’s affidavit for the second search warrant omitted material facts, such as the pipe being found in a locked bedroom accessible only to one resident, and that these omissions undermined probable cause. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that the omitted facts would not have defeated probable cause, as the resident in whose room the pipe was found could access the entirety of the home, including the appellant’s bedroom. The appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.Reviewing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that even if the omitted facts had been included in the affidavit, probable cause existed to search the entire mobile home because the resident implicated by the initial pipe discovery had access throughout the home. The Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and the conviction was affirmed. View "Urrutia v. State" on Justia Law

Gregory Dobbins was wrongfully convicted of possession of a controlled substance in Cook County, Illinois, based on fabricated evidence supplied by a corrupt police sergeant and his team. After serving prison time, Dobbins filed for post-conviction relief, and in April 2022, the circuit court vacated his conviction and the State dismissed the charges against him. Shortly after, Dobbins submitted a petition for a certificate of innocence (COI), which would allow him to seek compensation for his wrongful conviction. However, Dobbins passed away before the scheduled hearing on his COI petition.Following his death, his life partner and estate administrator, Katrina Crawford, moved to substitute herself as petitioner to continue the COI action on behalf of Dobbins’s estate. The circuit court denied this motion and dismissed the COI petition, ruling that the right to a COI is a personal statutory right that does not survive the petitioner’s death. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, affirmed the circuit court’s decision, reasoning that the COI statute did not permit estates to seek a COI and that a COI action is not a claim for damages that survives under the Survival Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. The court held that a petition for a COI is not an action to recover damages but rather a condition precedent to seeking compensation in the Court of Claims. Because the COI itself does not confer damages, the cause of action does not survive the petitioner’s death under the Survival Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition and denied substitution by the estate. View "People v. Dobbins" on Justia Law