Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Patrick J. Newcomer was serving supervised release for two separate federal convictions related to burglary of a Post Office and possession of a firearm by a felon. After completing his prison terms and beginning supervised release, he was again convicted in state court of two counts of burglary and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. These new convictions constituted violations of his federal supervised release conditions.Following Newcomer’s state convictions, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska revoked his supervised release for both federal cases. The court imposed 24 months’ imprisonment for each federal conviction, to run concurrently, and ordered these terms to be served after his state sentences. Additionally, the district court imposed two terms of supervised release—12 months each—set to run consecutively upon his release from imprisonment. Newcomer appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the new terms of supervised release should run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the legality of the district court’s revocation sentence de novo. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) governs only the commencement of original supervised release terms and does not apply to supervised release imposed following revocation. Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 provides the relevant authority, permitting a district court to impose additional supervised release upon revocation, and does not require such terms to run concurrently. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive supervised release terms and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Newcomer" on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 1993 of multiple violent sex offenses. Many years later, he filed a pro se motion in 2023, arguing that the district court had ordered a psychological evaluation three months before trial but failed to include the evaluation in the record or consider it at sentencing, as he alleged was required by statute. He claimed this omission meant the sentencing phase was never properly concluded, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to impose his sentence. His appointed attorney expanded these arguments, suggesting the evaluation implied a finding of incompetence to stand trial and that this raised constitutional concerns about his conviction’s validity.The Sedgwick District Court summarily denied the motion. The judge found that the evaluation occurred before trial and was not required to be part of the sentencing record. The court also determined that the evaluation was not related to the defendant’s competence to stand trial, but rather to the potential for a mental disease or defect defense. The court took judicial notice of a prior, similar claim by the defendant and noted that his allegations were unsupported.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas first determined the nature of the defendant’s postconviction motion, construing it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, rather than a habeas corpus motion. The court rejected constitutional arguments as improper for this procedural vehicle. On the merits, the court held that procedural errors alleged by the defendant, such as failing to consider the psychological evaluation, did not divest the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over sentencing. The court further held that failure to consider certain statutory factors does not render a sentence illegal under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court’s denial of the illegal-sentence motion. View "State v. Denney " on Justia Law

Christopher J. Allison was charged with multiple offenses, including theft, burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and terroristic threat. He pled guilty to the theft, burglary, and firearm charges. A jury convicted him of the remaining counts and found a statutory aggravating factor for first-degree murder, specifically that Allison committed the crime to avoid or prevent lawful arrest or prosecution. The jury determined this aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating circumstances, and the district court imposed a hard 40 life sentence, meaning Allison would not be eligible for parole for 40 years.After his conviction and sentencing, Allison appealed, raising various claims, but the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence. In 2014, Allison filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the sentence did not comply with certain statutory requirements. The Cowley District Court summarily denied the motion, stating the claims were not correctable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. Allison later filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence in 2020, which was again summarily denied by the Cowley District Court.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that Allison’s hard 40 sentence was not illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 because the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4624(5), (6), and K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4628 were met. The court also found that the district court’s consideration of statutory sentencing factors, including future dangerousness and threat to society, did not render the sentence illegal or constitute an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Allison " on Justia Law

Thomas Gatewood pleaded no contest to several felony charges, including first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated endangering a child, and aggravated intimidation of a witness. Prior to sentencing, the presentence investigation report classified Gatewood’s 2010 Oklahoma child-abuse conviction as a person felony, which elevated his criminal-history score to B and subjected him to a longer sentence. Gatewood objected to this classification, arguing that the Oklahoma statute was broader than Kansas’ person-felony criteria. The State responded that Gatewood was convicted under the injuring-torturing-or-maiming version of the Oklahoma statute, which required proof of bodily injury and the presence of another person—the child victim.The case was reviewed in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. At sentencing, the State produced the Oklahoma journal entry showing Gatewood pled guilty to “Child Abuse by Injury.” The district court determined the conviction was properly classified as a person felony and found Gatewood’s criminal-history score was B. Gatewood was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 615 months for felony murder, with a consecutive 228-month term for kidnapping, and concurrent sentences for the remaining offenses. The court also imposed several fees, including forensic services, a Children’s Advocacy Center assessment, and a sexual assault evidence collection kit fee. Gatewood did not object to these fees during proceedings.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Gatewood challenged the person felony classification and the imposed fees. The court held that the State met its burden of proof and that substantial competent evidence supported the district court’s classification of the Oklahoma conviction as a person felony. The Supreme Court affirmed both the sentence and the imposition of fees, declining to reach the merits of the fee challenges due to lack of preservation at the district court level. View "State v. Gatewood " on Justia Law

A Kansas Highway Patrol trooper stopped the defendant for speeding and observed signs of alcohol impairment, prompting a preliminary breath test. The test provided probable cause for arrest, and a subsequent certified breath alcohol test showed the defendant’s blood-alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. The defendant was charged with driving under the influence and speeding. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress evidence from the preliminary breath test, arguing various grounds including that any consent to the test was involuntary due to coercion. The parties stipulated to certain facts for the suppression motion, intending to frame legal issues for appellate review, and the defendant waived his right to a jury trial.The Ellsworth District Court denied the suppression motion based on the stipulated facts, without explicitly addressing the voluntariness argument, and found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the defendant limited his challenge to the voluntariness of his consent to the preliminary breath test, raising new sub-issues about statutory amendments and the effect of an officer retaining a driver’s license. The State argued that there was no evidence of duress, but the Court of Appeals panel majority dismissed the appeal, finding the voluntariness issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant’s motion lacked specific factual allegations required by statute. The dissent argued the issue was preserved and warranted remand for clarification.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. The court held that under K.S.A. 22-3216(2), a suppression motion must state specific facts showing why a search or seizure was unlawful, not merely conclusory statements. Because the defendant failed to allege sufficient facts in his motion to support his claim of involuntary consent, the statutory obligations of the prosecution and the district court were not triggered, and the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "State v. Anderson " on Justia Law

Kyle Hardwick was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of theft, and solicitation of perjury for the killings of Phil Anstine and Marion "Ed" Bates at a rural property in Reno County, Kansas. The evidence included forensic findings, eyewitness testimony, and Hardwick’s own admissions. Hardwick testified that he acted in self-defense after allegedly being sexually assaulted and threatened with firearms by Anstine and then encountering Bates, whom he said fired at him. Physical evidence at the scene, however, conflicted with Hardwick’s account, including the location and condition of the victims' bodies and the absence of supporting ballistic evidence.The case was tried in the Reno District Court, where Hardwick requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. The district court denied this request, reasoning that Hardwick was either justified in acting in self-defense or guilty of murder, depending on the jury’s view of premeditation. The jury was instructed on first- and second-degree murder and self-defense but not on imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter. Hardwick was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to two consecutive life terms plus additional concurrent sentences.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the conviction. The court held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, as Hardwick’s testimony provided some evidence—however weak—for such an instruction. Nonetheless, the error was deemed harmless because the strong circumstantial evidence of premeditation supported the jury’s verdict, and the jury rejected lesser homicide charges. The court also held that Hardwick’s preserved challenge to the admission of his post-Miranda silence failed; he had “opened the door” to impeachment, and the State’s use of that evidence was limited and constitutionally permissible. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hardwick " on Justia Law

Customs officers at JFK Airport conducted a random search of an aircraft arriving from Jamaica and discovered ten packages of cocaine hidden in the avionics compartment. After removing the drugs, officers replaced them with four “sham bricks,” one containing a transponder to signal movement. Paul Belloisi, an aircraft mechanic, drove to the plane in a maintenance vehicle, entered the avionics compartment, triggered the transponder, and exited empty-handed. Evidence at trial showed Belloisi was not assigned to the plane, possessed a jacket lined with slits likely for smuggling small items, and had suspicious communications with an individual named “Lester.” Belloisi claimed he was attempting to fix the air conditioning, but other testimony contradicted this account.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over Belloisi’s jury trial, where he was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import a controlled substance, and importation of a controlled substance. The trial court denied his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 108 months in prison. Belloisi appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to show he knew the smuggled items were controlled substances rather than other contraband.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case under the standard that a conviction must be supported by evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Second Circuit held that the government failed to prove that Belloisi possessed knowledge that the items in the compartment were controlled substances, rather than other contraband. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Belloisi" on Justia Law

A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law

In this case, Raul Rodriguez was charged in 1994 with several crimes, including the murder of Jose Alvaro Salavia. During the preliminary hearing, three police officers testified, primarily relaying hearsay statements from Rodriguez’s mother and uncle, indicating Rodriguez admitted to the shooting. No other evidence implicated Rodriguez, and the defense presented none. The court found probable cause, and Rodriguez subsequently pleaded guilty to second degree murder. The plea hearing did not include admissions to specific facts or a stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript; the court found a factual basis based on counsel’s stipulation.Years later, in 2022, Rodriguez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to California homicide law made him ineligible for a murder conviction under the prior theory. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County appointed counsel, ordered briefing, and reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, which contained the police officers’ hearsay testimony. The People argued Rodriguez was the sole perpetrator, making him ineligible for relief. Rodriguez did not provide specific factual allegations in response and submitted on the papers. The court denied the petition, finding Rodriguez had not established a prima facie case for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the order. It held that, at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition, courts may rely on hearsay statements admitted at the preliminary hearing, even if they would be inadmissible at a later evidentiary hearing, because the transcript serves to frame the issues rather than resolve factual disputes. The court affirmed the denial of Rodriguez’s petition but remanded the case to allow him thirty days to file an amended petition with nonconclusory factual allegations. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law