Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

John Ross Craig, along with two accomplices, entered a clothing store in 2012 and robbed employees at gunpoint, ordering them to lie on the floor and taking their wallets and phones. After being surrounded by police, the group negotiated for two hours before surrendering. Craig was charged with multiple counts, including kidnapping to commit robbery and second degree robbery, with firearm and gang enhancements, as well as allegations of prior serious felony convictions. In 2015, he pleaded no contest to two counts of second degree robbery, admitted to the firearm enhancement and prior felony allegations, and was sentenced to 23 years in prison.In 2024, Craig petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to recall and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing several legislative changes giving courts discretion to strike certain enhancements and asking for consideration of his post-conviction rehabilitation, youth at the time of the offense, and parole plans. The prosecution opposed, highlighting Craig’s prison rule violations. The superior court denied the petition, reasoning that Craig should be held to the plea agreement he entered and expressing skepticism about his rehabilitation and employment plans.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed whether the superior court’s order denying Craig’s petition was appealable and whether the court erred in its decision. The appellate court held that the denial affected Craig’s substantial rights and was therefore appealable. Importantly, it found the superior court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard—relying on Craig’s plea agreement rather than the statutory criteria for resentencing under section 1172.1. The appellate court reversed the denial and directed the superior court to conduct a new resentencing hearing in accordance with the proper legal standard. View "People v. Craig" on Justia Law

Four individuals, including Ronald Suber, were engaged in stealing catalytic converters from vehicles. During one theft, police were alerted and pursued the suspects. Anna Hurst was apprehended and confessed, while Suber and others escaped. Soon after, Suber expressed anger over Hurst’s arrest. Suber and another accomplice, Tori Balfour, met Hurst and Brian May at a convenience store. Surveillance footage confirmed their meeting, and Balfour testified that Suber accused Hurst and May of talking to police. Later, in a cornfield, Balfour claimed Suber shot Hurst and fired at May. Suber allegedly disposed of evidence and returned to his cousin’s house. May, wounded, sought help from a local resident, and Hurst’s body was found in the cornfield. DNA and ballistic evidence were collected, but the murder weapon was not recovered.The Superior Court of the State of Delaware held a jury trial where Balfour testified against Suber after receiving a plea deal. May did not appear for trial. The prosecution elicited testimony from detectives suggesting that May identified Suber as the shooter in a photo lineup, although May was unavailable for cross-examination. The defense did not object to this testimony. The jury found Suber guilty of first-degree murder and related charges, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional time.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed Suber's appeal, focusing on the use of indirect hearsay evidence that implicated Suber as the shooter through May’s supposed identification without direct testimony. The State conceded that this violated Suber’s constitutional confrontation rights. Applying the plain error standard, the Supreme Court determined the error was prejudicial to Suber’s substantial rights and undermined the fairness of the trial, given the central role of the indirect hearsay in corroborating the accomplice’s testimony. The Supreme Court vacated Suber’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Suber v. State" on Justia Law

Ahmed Mohamud Wasuge was found asleep in his car, which was blocking a lane of traffic on a residential road in King County, Washington. Police arrived after a 911 call and observed Wasuge in the driver’s seat with the engine running and the transmission in drive. Officers noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and unsteady movements. Wasuge denied drinking but performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was measured at 0.076 percent. He was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) under the “affected by” prong of the statute, as well as operating a vehicle without a functioning ignition interlock device and driving while his license was revoked.At trial in the King County Superior Court, Wasuge attempted to suppress non-Mirandized statements, but the motion was denied. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the felony DUI but convicted him of the lesser offense of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while “affected by” intoxicating liquor. He was also convicted on the other counts. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the admission of a toxicologist’s testimony about impairment at BAC levels below the legal limit was improper but harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court further concluded that Wasuge was not in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by police.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The main holdings are: (1) any error in admitting the toxicologist’s testimony was harmless under both constitutional and nonconstitutional standards, given the strength of the properly admitted evidence; and (2) courts may consider relevant and objective evidence of race and ethnicity in applying the “totality of the circumstances” custody test for Miranda purposes, though Wasuge was not in custody at the time of the contested questioning. View "State v. Wasuge" on Justia Law

Renton police and SWAT officers executed a search warrant at the apartment where Cristian Magaña Arévalo was staying with his family, seeking evidence related to the murder of Jason Hobbs. Officers ordered everyone out using a bullhorn, separated Magaña Arévalo from his family, restrained him with zip ties, and placed him in a patrol car before transporting him to a nearby parking lot. There, he was transferred to an officer’s work truck and questioned about Hobbs’s murder without receiving Miranda warnings. The officer told him he was “not under arrest” and asked if he would talk, which Magaña Arévalo agreed to. Two days later, he was interviewed again in a noncustodial setting, also without Miranda warnings.In King County Superior Court, Magaña Arévalo moved to suppress both statements, arguing the first was obtained during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and the second was tainted by the initial violation. The court held a CrR 3.5 hearing and ruled both statements admissible, finding neither interrogation custodial or coerced. The jury convicted Magaña Arévalo of first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to prison. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals found the December 1 interrogation was custodial and that admitting the statement was error, but held the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of other strong evidence, including the December 3 statement and physical evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed both parties’ petitions. It held that considering the totality of the circumstances—including restraints, isolation, police presence, and ethnicity—Magaña Arévalo was in custody during the December 1 interrogation, and admitting his statement without Miranda warnings violated his constitutional rights. However, the court found the December 3 statement was voluntary, noncustodial, and not tainted by the earlier violation. Applying a clarified harmless error standard, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Magana-Arevalo" on Justia Law

The appellant was previously convicted of multiple serious offenses, including attempted murder, grand larceny of a vehicle, and three counts of first-degree murder, for which he received a death sentence and additional prison terms. Decades later, federal habeas relief was granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his insanity defense, resulting in the vacatur of his conviction and sentence. Upon the State’s attempt to retry him, a competency evaluation found him incompetent to stand trial. The criminal complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and the State sought his civil commitment based on evidence that he has a mental disorder and poses a danger to himself and others.Following a hearing, the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Pershing County found clear and convincing evidence supporting civil commitment and ordered the appellant to a forensic mental health facility, to remain until he either qualifies for conditional release or reaches the statutory maximum duration for such commitment. The appellant argued that he should be credited for the time he spent in prison under the vacated conviction, citing NRS 176.055, and also contended that the civil commitment should not exceed ten years. The district court rejected these arguments, determining that credit for time served under NRS 176.055 does not apply to civil commitments, as such credit is limited to sentences imposed for criminal convictions.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that Nevada’s statutory scheme does not allow credit for time served in prison under a vacated criminal judgment to be applied against the duration of civil commitment, as civil commitment is a preventive and treatment-oriented measure rather than punitive. The court further held that NRS 178.463 does not provide credit in this context, as it applies only to time spent on conditional release, which the appellant has not received. View "Rogers v. State of Nevada" on Justia Law

Ajay, a recent immigrant from India with limited English proficiency, was investigated for alleged sexual assault and attempted sexual assault against a child under 14 in Reno, Nevada. The accusations stemmed from an incident involving a 13-year-old boy, A.P., whom Ajay met at his workplace and with whom he allegedly engaged in sexual acts. During a custodial police interrogation, Detective DeSantis read Ajay his Miranda rights in English. Ajay repeatedly expressed confusion, stated he was not good in English, and requested to speak in Hindi or have an interpreter. Despite this, DeSantis continued explaining the rights in English, using props and hypotheticals, until Ajay acquiesced and the interrogation proceeded, resulting in a confession.Ajay moved to suppress his statements before the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, arguing he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights due to his limited English proficiency. At a pretrial hearing, Ajay testified through an interpreter, detailing his lack of formal English education and unfamiliarity with the American legal system. The district court denied his motion, finding the waiver valid and voluntary, citing DeSantis’s efforts to clarify the warnings and Ajay’s apparent understanding.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether Ajay’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. The court found that Ajay's limited English skills and explicit requests for an interpreter demonstrated he did not understand his rights. The court held that law enforcement must recognize when a language barrier prevents meaningful waiver and provide an interpreter as necessary. The district court’s admission of Ajay’s confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given its significance at trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ajay v. State" on Justia Law

Anthony Lee was accused of assaulting Amy Groff at his home near Sequim, Washington. After an evening spent together, Lee became angry with Groff, allegedly due to her drug use, theft, and verbal abuse. When they returned home, Lee reportedly fired a gun in the air, struck Groff in the head with the gun, pushed her out of his truck, kicked and hit her, and then shot at her as she ran away. Groff was later found by police with visible injuries and recounted the assault to officers.Lee was charged in the Clallam County Superior Court with two counts of second degree assault with a deadly weapon, each based on separate alleged acts: one for beating Groff with the gun and another for shooting at her. At trial, the judge admitted Groff’s statements to police under the excited utterance exception to hearsay, and instructed the jury not to consider any judicial comments as opinions on the evidence. The jury found Lee guilty on both counts, and the trial court determined the assaults were distinct acts, rejecting Lee’s double jeopardy argument. Lee appealed, raising the double jeopardy issue and, for the first time, challenging the trial judge’s comment on the evidence. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, finding no double jeopardy violation and no manifest constitutional error regarding the judicial comment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that, under the unit of prosecution analysis and considering all relevant factors, Lee’s assaultive acts constituted a single course of conduct. Therefore, two convictions for second degree assault violated double jeopardy principles. The court reversed on that issue, ordering one conviction and its firearm enhancement to be vacated. On the comment on the evidence issue, the court affirmed, finding no manifest constitutional error that would permit review for the first time on appeal. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 1979, the appellant and his brother took a truck in Laramie, Wyoming, and drove it to Casper. The appellant pled guilty to felony Unauthorized Use of Automobile. The district court sentenced him, suspended the sentence, and placed him on probation. It further ordered that upon successful completion of one year of probation, he could withdraw his guilty plea and have the matter dismissed. After completing probation, the appellant was discharged, his guilty plea was withdrawn, and the case was dismissed. Despite this, the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation maintained records incorrectly indicating he was a convicted felon.In 2025, the appellant petitioned the District Court of Albany County to expunge his records under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502, which provides for expungement of felony convictions. The State did not oppose the petition. The district court denied the request, reasoning that the appellant’s case was resolved through a deferred prosecution process—specifically, the withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal after probation—under statutes governing deferred dispositions. It concluded that, as there was no felony conviction, there was no conviction to expunge. The appellant’s motion to reconsider was also denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard to statutory interpretation. It held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502 unambiguously limits expungement eligibility to persons convicted of felonies. The court determined that a deferred prosecution resulting in annulment or withdrawal of a guilty plea and dismissal does not constitute a conviction. Therefore, the appellant is not eligible for expungement under this statute. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s denial of the expungement petition. View "Lynch v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

On the evening of April 12, 2022, Ralph Kinerson was stabbed following a physical altercation at his home. Both Kinerson and Barclay Dylan Bennett testified that they fought that night, but their accounts differed regarding the circumstances and who initiated the violence. Kinerson claimed Bennett attacked him at his home, while Bennett asserted that Kinerson assaulted him in the street, aided by others, and denied stabbing Kinerson. The police interviewed witnesses, including Kinerson’s neighbor and Kinerson’s daughter, Malea, whose statements became central to the subsequent trial.During trial in the Spokane County Superior Court, Bennett was charged with first degree assault. Bennett’s defense focused on alleged deficiencies in the police investigation, suggesting that officers failed to consider other suspects. On cross-examination, Bennett introduced portions of Malea’s interview with a detective to support this theory, referencing statements about another woman, Abbey Pearson, possibly stealing from Kinerson. In response, the State introduced another part of Malea’s interview, which suggested Bennett had a motive to attack Kinerson due to his relationship with Kinerson’s friend, Roberts. Bennett objected on hearsay and Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing he could not confront Malea, who was unavailable to testify. The trial court overruled the objection, finding Bennett had “opened the door” to the evidence.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed Bennett’s conviction, concluding that any error in admitting the hearsay was invited by Bennett’s own actions and precluded review, even for constitutional claims. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the appellate decision, holding that the statement’s admission was justified under the rule of completeness (ER 106). The Court found the statement was not offered for its truth but to contextualize the investigation, so it did not trigger the confrontation clause. Bennett’s conviction was upheld. View "State v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The case centers on the disappearance of Alice Queirolo in Minot, North Dakota, in December 2020. Queirolo, who was medically vulnerable due to a brain tumor and lived with two roommates, including Shawnee Krall, maintained daily contact with her family and coworkers to monitor her health. After she failed to report to work and did not respond to welfare checks, law enforcement investigated and discovered a series of circumstantial evidence including surveillance footage, witness testimony, and Krall’s behavior following her disappearance. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting that Queirolo’s disappearance was uncharacteristic, that Krall was uncooperative during the investigation, and that Krall made statements to another inmate admitting to killing the victim. There was no direct evidence, such as a body or autopsy results, due to suppression of evidence from a warrantless search.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, presided over a five-day jury trial. The jury found Krall guilty of intentional or knowing murder under North Dakota law. Krall was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Krall argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, primarily because it was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to Queirolo’s death. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to give his requested jury instruction that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find Krall guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. The court also held that the district court did not err in giving the standard pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and explicitly overruled prior decisions requiring the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis” instruction. The conviction and judgment were affirmed. View "State v. Krall" on Justia Law