Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant committed a series of robberies, one of which involved the fatal shooting of a victim by an accomplice. He was charged with Hobbs Act robbery, using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i), and causing death during that firearm use under 18 U.S.C. §924(j). A jury found him guilty on all counts, and the District Court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term, merging the sentences for the firearm offenses. After subsequent appellate proceedings, including reconsideration in light of Supreme Court decisions, the District Court resentenced the defendant, ultimately merging the convictions related to the firearm offenses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether the defendant could be convicted under both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) for the same act. The Second Circuit held that, notwithstanding the overlap between the two provisions and the Blockburger v. United States test indicating they are the same offense, Congress had authorized cumulative punishments for both. The appellate court relied in part on its reading of Supreme Court precedent and statutory language concerning consecutive sentences, instructing the District Court to impose separate convictions and sentences for each provision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. The Court found that the Blockburger presumption—that Congress does not intend to punish the same offense under two statutes—applies, and no statutory text, structure, or legislative history overcame that presumption. As a result, a single act violating both provisions may yield only one conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the relevant part of the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Barrett v. United States" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents investigated the defendant after he sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant in three controlled buys in Suffolk County, New York. Based on these transactions, agents executed a search warrant at his residence and seized drugs, firearms, packaging materials, and cash. The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and possession of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.At sentencing, the district court considered the defendant’s background and criminal history and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. The court orally pronounced certain mandatory and special conditions of supervised release, but did not recite or specifically incorporate by reference the full set of standard conditions recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines or the Probation Department. The written judgment included thirteen standard conditions and several special conditions, some of which expanded on or added new requirements not mentioned orally.Nearly three years after judgment, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Although the appeal was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the government did not timely raise the issue, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined the objection was forfeited. The court reviewed the merits of the appeal and held that the district court erred by imposing the standard conditions and certain special conditions without proper oral pronouncement or clear judicial determination. The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to vacate the thirteen standard conditions and three special conditions (mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and search condition), allowing the district court to conduct further proceedings and potentially reimpose these conditions in compliance with procedural requirements. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Law enforcement charged the defendant with multiple counts of possession of child sexual abuse material and child exploitation after content was discovered on his cell phone. The investigation began when Snapchat’s automated hash-based scanning program flagged a 16-second video uploaded from the defendant’s account as known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Snapchat forwarded this video to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which confirmed the file’s hash matched previously identified CSAM but did not view the video itself. NCMEC then sent the report and video to the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ), where a DOJ analyst first viewed the video without a warrant. Subsequently, local law enforcement also viewed the video without a warrant, obtained account information via subpoena, and secured a search warrant for the defendant’s home and devices, leading to the recovery of additional CSAM.In Waukesha County Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that viewing the video without a warrant constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding a legitimate privacy interest in the cell phone and concluding that the private search doctrine was inapplicable because no human at Snapchat had seen the video and the hash algorithm used was allegedly unreliable.The State appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video due to Snapchat’s policies and the nature of the conduct, and found no Fourth Amendment search occurred.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Snapchat’s automated scan constituted a private search, and that the government’s subsequent viewing of the flagged video did not exceed the scope of that private search. Because any expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private scan and there was virtual certainty regarding the video’s contents, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of suppression and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

The defendant was born and raised in Lebanon and was recruited into Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in 1996. He received various forms of military-type training, including weapons, explosives, and surveillance, and participated in operations against Israeli targets. After moving to the United States in 2000, he continued his involvement with Hizballah by traveling back to Lebanon for further training and assignments. In 2004 and 2005, he received advanced explosives and surveillance training, including field exercises and site surveillance in Istanbul and New York City, where he documented potential targets for Hizballah. His activities with Hizballah ceased in spring 2005.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant in 2019 on multiple counts, including receiving military-type training from Hizballah (Count Three). After a jury trial, he was found guilty on Count Three and two other counts, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for Count Three, with a sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for terrorism-related offenses. Neither the parties nor the district court recognized that the relevant statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) was enacted in December 2004, or that certain enhancements and waivers only applied to post-March 2006 conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that although the district court erred by not instructing the jury to consider only post-enactment conduct, there was no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted due to substantial evidence of post-enactment conduct. The court also concluded that the retroactive application of the statute of limitations waiver was permissible because the original limitation period had not expired. However, the court vacated the sentence, finding plain error in the application of the terrorism enhancement and remanded for resentencing. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Saab" on Justia Law

During a daytime traffic stop in Lawrence, Massachusetts, a police officer encountered a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been reported missing by the Department of Children and Families. The juvenile was seated in a vehicle with an infant and three adults, one of whom was known by the officer to be affiliated with a street gang. The officer ordered the juvenile out of the car without asking any questions and immediately conducted a patfrisk, discovering a handgun on the juvenile’s person. The juvenile was subsequently charged with multiple firearms offenses and indicted as a youthful offender on one count.The Essex County Juvenile Court reviewed the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the exit order and patfrisk, arguing violation of constitutional rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the officer's actions unjustified under the circumstances. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed the appeal. The Appeals Court reversed the suppression order, concluding the officer’s actions were reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the officer’s exit order was justified under the community caretaking doctrine, as the officer was acting to ensure the safety and well-being of a missing juvenile. However, due to inconsistencies in the Juvenile Court judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the officer’s testimony about key facts supporting the patfrisk, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for clarification of factual findings and reconsideration of the legal conclusions in light of those findings and the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Demos D." on Justia Law

On the evening of November 10, 2021, the defendant unlawfully entered a residence in West Hartford, Connecticut, where multiple individuals were present, including his ex-girlfriend and her family. The defendant shot one of the occupants, Dyquan Daniels, in the face and threatened another before fleeing. Police apprehended the defendant shortly afterward and found gunshot residue on his hand. The prosecution charged the defendant with several offenses, including home invasion, assault in the first degree by discharge of a firearm, criminal possession of a firearm, threatening in the second degree, and two counts of risk of injury to a child.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford. The state’s operative information charged the defendant generally under the home invasion statute, with language tracking one specific subdivision, but did not specify a particular subsection or subdivision. During trial, defense counsel argued a third-party culpability defense, suggesting someone else committed the shooting. The trial court instructed the jury on home invasion using a different subdivision than the one tracked in the information, requiring proof that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not commit plain error in its instructions because the defendant received adequate notice that he could be convicted under either subdivision of the home invasion statute, as the facts alleged and the related counts necessarily involved being armed with a deadly weapon. The court also found no double jeopardy violation, determining that home invasion and assault in the first degree each require proof of distinct elements. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Christon" on Justia Law

Brent Dubois was convicted in 2011 of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, receiving a sentence of 188 months in prison and three years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, a condition required him to participate in a substance abuse program, allowing the probation office to decide whether that would be inpatient or outpatient treatment. After a relevant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, Dubois’s sentence was reduced to 151 months. Upon completing his incarceration in 2023, Dubois began supervised release, but struggled to comply with outpatient treatment requirements. After repeated difficulties and four revocation hearings, his probation officer filed a petition for revocation, leading Dubois to admit to violations except one allegation, which the government withdrew.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas sentenced Dubois to ten months in prison and 32 months of supervised release, reimposing the original supervised release conditions. Notably, it again permitted the probation office to determine whether Dubois’s substance abuse treatment would be inpatient or outpatient. Dubois did not object to this condition at sentencing, but later appealed, arguing that the delegation of this decision to the probation office was improper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard, given Dubois’s lack of objection in district court. The Fifth Circuit held that permitting the probation office to decide between inpatient and outpatient treatment constituted an impermissible delegation of the district court’s core judicial sentencing function, particularly since the sentence following revocation was only ten months. The court found this error to be clear under existing precedent, affected Dubois’s substantial rights, and warranted discretionary correction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the supervised release condition at issue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dubois" on Justia Law

Farhan Sheikh, a college student and active iFunny user, posted a series of public messages threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago abortion clinic, naming the clinic and specifying a date. He repeatedly emphasized in follow-up posts and private messages that his threats were genuine and not satirical, even stating his intent to carry out the actions. After his posts were reported to the FBI, the clinic was warned, canceled appointments, increased security, and an employee took time off in response to the threat. Sheikh was arrested and indicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sheikh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional and the grand jury had not been properly instructed on the law's requirements regarding true threats and criminal intent. The district court denied his motion and proceeded to trial, where evidence included employee testimony and images of security changes at the clinic. Sheikh testified that he did not intend to carry out the threats, but the jury convicted him. His motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Sheikh’s constitutional challenge to § 875(c), his grand jury process objections, and his evidentiary complaints. The Seventh Circuit held that § 875(c) is constitutional when interpreted to criminalize only true threats made with at least reckless intent, consistent with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court found no reversible error in the grand jury process or the admission of evidence at trial, concluding that any evidentiary mistakes were harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sheikh" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in North Dakota for misdemeanor Sexual Assault after entering a guilty plea to having inappropriate contact with a person and having reasonable cause to believe the contact was offensive. He was originally charged with a more serious felony, but the plea agreement stipulated a lesser offense and specifically stated he was not required to register as a sex offender under North Dakota law. After relocating to Montana, the Department of Justice informed him that, based on Montana’s interpretation of his conviction and the age of the victim alleged in the charging documents, he was required to register as a sex offender under Montana law.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Montana reviewed his petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Montana DOJ from requiring registration. The court denied his petition, reasoning that the proper remedy was to register and then later petition for removal under Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-506. The District Court also concluded that the facts alleged in the North Dakota charging document, though not proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the appellant, were sufficient to impose the registration duty.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court. The Supreme Court held that a writ of prohibition was an appropriate remedy because there was no statutory or administrative process for contesting the DOJ’s determination, and registration requirements under Montana law are punitive. The Court further held that Montana courts may not rely on facts not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant when determining registration duties. Finally, the Court concluded that the North Dakota misdemeanor Sexual Assault statute is not reasonably equivalent to the Montana sexual offense statute that triggers registration, due to the lack of an age element in the North Dakota statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Daquon Ray Washington was charged in 2019 with first degree burglary with a person present and grand theft of an automobile. The information alleged prior convictions and jail terms for burglary and receiving stolen property, making him subject to sentence enhancements under several provisions of the Penal Code, including two one-year enhancements under then-section 667.5(b). Washington pleaded no contest and admitted the prior convictions. He was sentenced to eight years in state prison, with the section 667.5(b) enhancements imposed but stayed.Following legislative amendments, Penal Code section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1) retroactively invalidated most enhancements imposed under section 667.5(b), except for those involving sexually violent offenses. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Washington as serving a sentence including an invalid enhancement. In April 2024, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied resentencing, concluding that Washington was ineligible because the enhancements were stayed at sentencing. While Washington’s appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court in People v. Rhodius clarified that section 1172.75 applies to invalid enhancements regardless of whether they were stayed or executed, mandating resentencing if such enhancements were imposed.While Washington’s appeal was pending, he was released on parole. The People argued in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, that release on parole terminated eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that eligibility for resentencing does not require the defendant to remain incarcerated until the resentencing takes place. Once identified by CDCR as eligible, subsequent release on parole does not preclude relief; resentencing can afford practical benefits, such as shortening the parole term. The appellate court reversed the superior court’s denial of resentencing and remanded for further proceedings consistent with section 1172.75. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law