Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1985, Douglas Carter was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Eva Olesen in Provo, Utah. There was no physical evidence linking Carter to the crime scene, but he signed a confession, and two witnesses, Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, provided testimony corroborating aspects of his confession. Decades later, the Tovars signed declarations stating that the police had threatened them, pressured them to make untrue statements, and instructed them to lie at Carter’s trial about financial support they had received from the police. Based on these revelations, Carter petitioned for postconviction relief.The Fourth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Carter’s trial and sentencing were tainted by serious misconduct by the lead prosecutor, the lead investigator, and another police officer. The court found that the police had suborned perjury, threatened the Tovars with deportation and separation from their son, and provided them with financial assistance, which they were instructed to lie about. The prosecutor did not disclose this information to the defense or correct the false testimony at trial.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court’s findings. The court concluded that the State had violated Carter’s constitutional right to due process by suppressing evidence favorable to Carter and by failing to correct false testimony. The court determined that these violations prejudiced Carter at both the guilt and sentencing stages of his trial. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant Carter’s petition for postconviction relief, vacate his conviction and sentence, and order a new trial. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Anthony Charles Deberry was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The incident occurred outside Born’s Bar in St. Paul, Minnesota, where Deberry had an altercation with a man named Turtle. Surveillance footage showed Deberry returning to the bar later that evening, and witnesses testified that he had a gun. A shootout ensued, and Deberry was seen on video with a gun, which he later hid under a parked car. Deberry claimed he was acting in self-defense, stating he wrestled the gun away from another man who shot him.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota instructed the jury that Deberry had to prove his justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Deberry, and he appealed, arguing that the burden of proof for his justification defense was misplaced and that his sentence enhancements for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense and for obstructing justice were erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Deberry’s justification defense did not negate his knowing possession of the firearm. The court affirmed the district court’s instruction that Deberry had the burden to prove his justification defense. Regarding the sentence enhancements, the court found no clear error in the district court’s application of enhancements for reckless discharge of a firearm and second-degree assault, as well as for obstructing justice. The court concluded that the district court’s findings were supported by the record and affirmed Deberry’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Deberry" on Justia Law

Walter Dushun Holmes, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. His father, Walter Holmes, Sr., and Monetessa Packineau, among others, were also indicted. While Holmes Sr. and Packineau entered plea agreements, Holmes Jr. went to trial. During the trial, Holmes Jr. requested a sequestration order for witnesses, which was granted. The Government presented multiple witnesses, including Packineau and A.P., who testified about their drug transactions with Holmes Jr. Holmes Jr. attempted to call his father as a witness, but the court excluded Holmes Sr. due to a violation of the sequestration order, based on recorded jail phone calls. Holmes Jr. moved for a mistrial and later for a new trial, both of which were denied by the district court.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota sentenced Holmes Jr. to 188 months’ imprisonment. Holmes Jr. appealed, challenging the exclusion of his father’s testimony, the jury deliberation instructions, the denial of a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of Holmes Sr. as a witness, as Holmes Jr. had violated the sequestration order. The court also determined that the district court’s scheduling communications with the jury were not coercive and did not constitute supplemental jury instructions. Regarding the alleged Brady violation, the court held that the undisclosed evidence was cumulative of information already available to Holmes Jr., and thus, there was no violation. Finally, the court found that the district court did not commit procedural error in sentencing and that the sentence was substantively reasonable.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Frank Edward Stearns was stopped by police on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) after a 911 caller reported that he appeared drunk and was staggering in a parking lot. The caller described Stearns and his vehicle in detail. Officer Natalie BrinJones responded to the call, observed Stearns driving erratically, and eventually stopped him. Stearns exhibited signs of intoxication, and subsequent breath tests confirmed his blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit.Stearns was charged with DUI, failure to obey a police officer, operating a vehicle without a required interlock device, and driving with a suspended license. He moved to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop. Stearns was convicted on all charges except driving with a suspended license. On appeal, the superior court reversed the convictions, ruling the stop was unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the stop was lawful. The court found the 911 call reliable because it was a contemporaneous eyewitness report to the emergency line, and the officer's observations corroborated the caller's report. The court concluded that the caller's description of Stearns's behavior, combined with the officer's observations, provided a sufficient factual basis for reasonable suspicion of DUI. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Stearns's convictions. View "City of Wenatchee v. Stearns" on Justia Law

Curtis Solomon, Devin Chance, and Jamaur Lewis were convicted of multiple counts, including Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery, and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Their convictions for conspiracy to carry a firearm during a crime of violence were vacated following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States. The district court amended their judgments by removing the vacated counts but reimposed the same sentences on the remaining counts without providing an explanation for denying their requests for de novo resentencing.The appellants appealed the amended judgments, arguing that the district court erred by not explaining its decision to deny de novo resentencing and contending that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellants' challenge to the district court's refusal to conduct a de novo resentencing because no certificate of appealability (COA) had been issued on that question. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to consider the appellants' challenge to their § 924(c) convictions based on Hobbs Act robbery.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its precedent that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, did not disturb its prior holdings that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. Therefore, the appellants' § 924(c) convictions based on Hobbs Act robbery were affirmed.The court affirmed the appellants' § 924(c) convictions and dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction regarding the challenge to the district court's denial of de novo resentencing. View "USA v. Solomon" on Justia Law

In 2008, a cab driver committed a series of violent attacks against four other cab drivers in the District of Columbia. The attacks included puncturing tires, brandishing a knife, ramming vehicles, and attempting to run over victims. The perpetrator was arrested in March 2009 and found guilty by a jury in June 2011 on thirteen counts, including assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault while armed, and destruction of property.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia sentenced the defendant to an aggregate of 290 months of imprisonment and imposed a total of $1,000 in assessments under the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act (VVCCA). The defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's decisions on various grounds. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed these issues, resulting in a remand for resentencing on certain counts. The trial court subsequently resentenced the defendant, but the total term of imprisonment remained unchanged.The defendant then filed a pro se motion in January 2022, arguing that his convictions should be dismissed. The trial court denied the motion as procedurally barred, and the defendant appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the VVCCA assessments did not constitute fines. The court reasoned that the assessments were mandatory and separate from the punishment imposed, serving primarily to fund the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of the VVCCA assessments, concluding that the sentence was legal. View "Tornero v. United States" on Justia Law

In the early morning of March 24, 2015, Kenneth Lopez was shot and killed on Dwight Street in Springfield. His body was discovered the next morning. Lee Manuel Rios was arrested nine days later and charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and several firearms offenses. In February 2018, a jury convicted Rios of first-degree murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation, sentencing him to life in prison without parole.Rios appealed his convictions, the denial of his motion to suppress mail intercepted by the jail, the denial of his posttrial motion for a new trial, and sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. He also sought a new trial on several firearms convictions in light of the decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found no reason to exercise its extraordinary power to grant a new trial or reduce Rios's conviction of first-degree murder. The court affirmed the murder conviction and other firearm offenses, as well as the orders denying his pretrial motion to suppress and posttrial motion for a new trial. However, the court vacated Rios's convictions under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) and (h) and remanded those charges for a new trial, in accordance with the decision in Guardado II. View "Commonwealth v. Rios" on Justia Law

In 2021, Scott Michael Andrew Hundley fatally stabbed Thomas Cekada Jr. after an altercation. Hundley claimed self-defense, stating that Cekada had brandished a firearm at him twice, once at a Dollar General store and later during a car collision on Mountain Mission Road. Hundley was indicted for first-degree murder by the Jefferson County Grand Jury.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held a pre-trial hearing where Hundley’s motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement was denied. The court found that Hundley’s statement about needing a lawyer was equivocal and that he was not in custody at the time. The court also granted the State’s motion to exclude evidence of Cekada’s drug use, ruling it irrelevant without expert testimony linking the drugs to irrational behavior. The court denied the State’s request to introduce evidence of Hundley’s prior stabbing incident under Rule 404(b).At trial, the State presented testimony from officers and witnesses, including evidence that Cekada’s hands were bloody but his firearm was not. Hundley testified, reiterating his self-defense claim. The court allowed the State to argue in rebuttal that the lack of blood on the firearm disproved Hundley’s self-defense claim. The jury found Hundley guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty-five years in prison, including a recidivist enhancement.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the toxicology report and text messages about Cekada’s drug use. The court also upheld the circuit court’s control over closing arguments and found no prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations. The court affirmed Hundley’s conviction and sentence. View "State v. Hundley" on Justia Law

Vincent Deritis was convicted by a jury of four offenses involving child sexual abuse material. Count One involved using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for producing a visual depiction, based on a video of his stepdaughter showering. Counts Two and Three involved similar charges based on photographs of his stepdaughter while she was sleeping. Count Four involved possession of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced him to 600 months of imprisonment and imposed a special assessment of $117,000.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Deritis's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Google account, finding that the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court also denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Counts One and Two, finding substantial evidence supported the convictions. Additionally, the court excluded exculpatory testimony from Deritis's ex-wife, which Deritis argued was impermissible hearsay. The district court instructed the jury on the definition of "lascivious exhibition" using the Dost factors, which Deritis challenged as erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, since the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court found that the jury instruction on "lascivious exhibition" was proper and consistent with precedent. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the convictions on Counts One and Two. The exclusion of the exculpatory testimony was deemed harmless error. However, the court found that the district court plainly erred by imposing a special assessment without considering the mandatory statutory factors on the record.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the special assessment and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "U.S. v. Deritis" on Justia Law

David Nutter was indicted in August 2021 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Nutter had three prior convictions in Ohio for domestic violence and child endangerment. He acknowledged possessing firearms and did not dispute his prior convictions but moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Nutter's motion, applying the means-end analysis from District of Columbia v. Heller. Nutter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which rejected the means-end analysis, Nutter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional under the new framework. The district court again denied the motion, concluding that § 922(g)(9) was consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals deemed a threat to public safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional, finding that it fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court noted that the statute's purpose and method align with historical analogues, such as surety and going armed laws, which were designed to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Nutter's motion to dismiss the indictment and upheld his conviction. View "United States v. Nutter" on Justia Law