Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was indicted in February 2018 for several traffic-related offenses, including fourth-degree driving under the influence, second-degree driving on a DUI-suspended license while under the influence, and being a persistent felony offender. Concerns about his mental health led to multiple competency evaluations at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center, resulting in conflicting reports: one finding him competent, another finding him incompetent due to religious delusions, and a final evaluation concluding he was competent after successful treatment with antipsychotic medication. The appellant’s initial plea agreement resulted in a twenty-year sentence, which was probated for five years.After the trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence, the appellant moved to vacate, arguing the persistent felony offender charge was treated incorrectly as a standalone conviction. The Todd Circuit Court denied this motion, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, citing palpable error and procedural mistakes regarding probation revocation. The Supreme Court of Kentucky then vacated the sentence for the persistent felony offender charge and remanded for resentencing on the two Class D felonies.Upon resentencing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether the appellant was competent to be resentenced and whether the amended twenty-year sentence was legal. The Court held that the trial court correctly found the appellant competent, based on substantial evidence from the final psychiatric evaluation. The Court further held that the twenty-year aggregate sentence for the two Class D felonies, enhanced by the persistent felony offender conviction and ordered to run consecutively, was lawful under Kentucky statutes governing consecutive sentences and persistent felony offender enhancements. The judgment of the Todd Circuit Court was affirmed. View "MOORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The appellant pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to kill while armed, pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) which specified a twelve-year sentence. Before sentencing, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that one of his attorneys had incorrectly advised him that the judge could reduce the agreed-upon sentence to eight years. Testimony at the motion hearing established that this inaccurate advice was provided, and the trial court credited the attorney who testified to the miscommunication.Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia considered the motion to withdraw. The trial court found that although the appellant did not have competent counsel at all times, he failed to show that he would not have taken the plea but for the incorrect advice. The trial court applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, requiring a reasonable probability that the attorney’s deficient performance caused the plea, and denied the motion to withdraw.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court clarified that, under the standard for presentence withdrawal of guilty pleas, a defendant need not show strict Strickland prejudice, especially when the request is made before sentencing. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by requiring such a showing and by not properly weighing the competency of counsel with other relevant factors such as promptness of withdrawal and assertion of legal innocence. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the trial court to reassess whether justice demands the withdrawal of the guilty plea based on the correct legal standard. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted following a bench trial for unlawful entry after refusing to leave a convenience store when asked to do so by a Metropolitan Police Department officer at the request of a store clerk. The arrest occurred shortly after the discovery of a deceased person in the store’s back room, which led to the defendant expressing frustration that the store had not been closed to customers. The responding officer testified at trial, recounting that the store clerk asked for assistance in removing the defendant, and body-worn camera footage corroborated the clerk’s request and the officer’s repeated instructions for the defendant to leave.The case was originally tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government failed to prove that a person with authority asked the defendant to leave, that it relied on inadmissible hearsay, and that the defendant did not refuse to leave the premises. The trial court credited the testimony of the police officer and found the defendant guilty of unlawful entry.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction. The appellant argued that the clerk’s statement was inadmissible hearsay, that the government failed to show lawful authority to request his removal, and that there was insufficient evidence of refusal to leave. The Court of Appeals held that the clerk’s statement was properly admitted as nonhearsay because it was introduced to show its effect on the officer and to explain the officer's actions, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The court also found sufficient evidence that the clerk had lawful authority over the premises and that the defendant refused to leave after being repeatedly instructed. The conviction was affirmed. View "Hinton v. United States" on Justia Law

Federal and state authorities initially suspected Luz Jiminez of involvement in a drug-trafficking organization based in Phoenix, Arizona. Investigators obtained a wiretap order to intercept communications from Jiminez and her associates. Through intercepted calls, they learned Jiminez planned to pick up luggage for someone named “Rondo,” later identified as Liggins. Using a “check and miss” scheme, Liggins sent a bag containing nearly $37,000 from Detroit to Phoenix, which Jiminez retrieved but abandoned after noticing surveillance. A police dog alerted to drugs, and a warrant led to the discovery of the money. Separately, Detroit authorities arrested DeHaven Murphy, who possessed heroin and later implicated Liggins. Murphy arranged recorded calls with Liggins, but Detroit officers testified their investigation was independent of the Arizona wiretap.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan presided over Liggins’s trial, where a jury convicted him on drug charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction due to judicial bias and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Liggins moved to suppress evidence derived from the Arizona wiretap, arguing violations of federal wiretap laws. The district court denied the motion, finding Liggins lacked standing as an “aggrieved person” under Title III and that the Detroit evidence was untainted by the Arizona wiretap. Liggins entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve his right to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Liggins qualified as an “aggrieved person” entitled to move for suppression under Title III. The court held that regardless of the interpretation, Liggins was not an “aggrieved person”: he did not participate in intercepted calls, the calls did not use his property, and he was not named or targeted in the wiretap application. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Liggins" on Justia Law

The defendant, while on supervised release following a federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, was arrested in May 2023 for new state charges involving drug trafficking, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. These events occurred after violations that led to his second supervised release revocation but before the hearing for those violations, and were not discovered by the federal probation office until several months later. Upon learning of the May 2023 incident, after the defendant had completed his sentence and was again on supervised release, the probation office initiated the proceedings at issue, seeking a third revocation based on the new conduct.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held a hearing to determine if the defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the revocation proceeding, ultimately allowing him to represent himself. After a subsequent hearing, the district court found violations of supervised release, classified the new conduct as a Grade A violation, and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The defendant timely appealed, challenging the validity of his waiver of counsel, the sentencing procedure, and the constitutionality of his underlying conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the right to counsel in a supervised release revocation is not derived from the Sixth Amendment but is governed by statutory and due process considerations. The court reviewed the waiver of counsel for abuse of discretion and found the district court’s inquiry sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no procedural error in sentencing, concluding that the district court did not improperly rely on prohibited factors. Finally, the court declined to consider the challenge to the underlying conviction, holding that such arguments must be raised on direct appeal or collateral review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Spence" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of sex trafficking a minor after police located the missing child in an apartment where he was staying. The police had responded to a missing persons report filed by the minor’s father, who believed the child was endangered. Investigators traced the minor’s Snapchat activity to an IP address at the apartment and, after gaining access from a tenant in the building, entered the unlocked apartment briefly to ask about the missing child. During this encounter, the defendant emerged from a bedroom. Subsequent evidence, including text messages from a phone recovered from the minor, supported the prosecution’s case.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence related to the police entry and admitted several text messages and emails as evidence. During jury selection, the court temporarily sealed the courtroom while questioning potential jurors about sensitive matters, with defense counsel expressly stating there was no objection. At the close of trial, the court mistakenly allowed alternate jurors into the deliberation room but promptly removed them and instructed the jury to disregard any statements by the alternates and restart deliberations if needed. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the police entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception, the temporary courtroom sealing did not violate the public trial right due to waiver, and the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. The court also found no reversible error in the alternate juror incident, as there was no showing of prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who, while living with his parents and sister, became involved in a heated conflict with his sister. During the altercation, he threatened her and, at one point, pointed a gun and later a taser at her, ultimately leading her to leave the house. The defendant was charged by the Riverside County District Attorney with multiple offenses, including assault with a semiautomatic firearm, making criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery. The defendant filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by diagnoses from mental health professionals indicating longstanding mental disorders that contributed to his conduct.Prior to trial, the Superior Court of Riverside County held a hearing on the motion. The court found a connection between the defendant’s mental health diagnoses and his conduct but concluded that his actions were primarily motivated by his sister’s threats to out him to their parents, rather than by his mental disorder alone. The court denied the diversion motion, reasoning that the defendant did not fall within the “spirit” of the diversion statute because he had been compliant with mental health treatment at the time of the incident and had no prior criminal history.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case after the defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying the motion on improper grounds, misapplying the legal standard for diversion. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing consistent with the correct legal standards, emphasizing that eligibility for diversion does not require a mental disorder to be the sole motivating factor in the offense. The petition was granted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flareau v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Daqua Ritter was indicted for three federal crimes connected to the murder of Ernest “Dime” Doe, a transgender woman in rural South Carolina. Ritter and Doe had a secretive sexual relationship, and Ritter was sensitive about public knowledge of this relationship, especially since Doe openly referred to Ritter as her boyfriend. Evidence at trial showed Ritter pressured Doe to keep their relationship hidden and reacted angrily when others mentioned it. Doe was found shot dead in a car, and Ritter was last seen with her hours before her death. After the murder, Ritter disposed of his gun and burned his clothes. A federal grand jury indicted Ritter for willfully causing bodily injury based on Doe's gender identity resulting in death, using a gun during a crime of violence, and making false statements to investigators.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina presided over Ritter’s trial. A jury convicted Ritter on all charges, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. Ritter moved for a new trial, claiming juror bias and prejudicial hearsay testimony, and challenged the sufficiency of evidence for two counts. The district court held an evidentiary hearing regarding juror bias and denied the motion for a new trial, finding the juror credible and impartial. It also denied the motion for a mistrial based on hearsay, issuing a curative instruction to disregard the testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no juror bias or in denying a mistrial based on hearsay, as the curative instruction was sufficient. The court also found that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ritter on all counts, including motive based on gender identity and the likelihood that false statements would be communicated to federal law enforcement. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Ritter" on Justia Law

The defendant is incarcerated for murder and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has spent most of her sentence in an inpatient psychiatric treatment program and has been largely unresponsive to medications administered under an involuntary medication order. After other treatments failed, the acting warden petitioned for authorization to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as her condition persisted and she lacked the capacity to provide informed consent. Both parties stipulated to her incapacity to consent to ECT, and she conceded on appeal that ECT is medically necessary.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held an evidentiary hearing and granted the warden’s petition, authorizing ECT for six months, the maximum period allowed by statute. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the medical necessity of ECT but argued that the statutory requirement for “no less onerous alternatives” to ECT should include procedural alternatives, specifically the possibility of obtaining informed consent from a surrogate decisionmaker under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5326.7.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. It held that the “no less onerous alternatives” language in Penal Code section 2679 refers to medical alternatives to ECT, not alternative procedural methods such as surrogate consent. The court found that the statutory scheme intentionally excludes ECT from expedited surrogate decision-making provisions, requiring judicial authorization instead. The court rejected the argument that the warden must seek surrogate consent before judicial authorization and affirmed the trial court’s order authorizing ECT. View "P. v. T.B." on Justia Law

David Ho-Romero was stopped at the border near San Diego in February 2021, and authorities discovered over 11 kilograms of methamphetamine in his vehicle. He was subsequently indicted for importing methamphetamine. During the investigation, prosecutors called Witness 1, Ho-Romero’s former romantic partner, to testify before a grand jury. After learning of Witness 1’s involvement from his roommate, Ho-Romero contacted Witness 1 and her friend (Witness 2), making statements that the government interpreted as threats. Based on these communications, Ho-Romero was charged with witness tampering but pled guilty only to drug importation, not to tampering. The parties agreed to dismiss the tampering charges in exchange for Ho-Romero stipulating to the admissibility of Witness 1 and Witness 2’s grand jury testimony.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California ordered a presentence report recommending an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Defense counsel objected, arguing Ho-Romero did not willfully obstruct justice. At sentencing, the district court applied the enhancement, interpreting “willfulness” as an objective standard without requiring a finding of specific intent to obstruct justice. The court found only that Ho-Romero’s statements could be understood as threats. With the enhancement, the Guidelines range increased, but the court imposed a downward departure, sentencing Ho-Romero to 60 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Ho-Romero appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for legal error. The court held that § 3C1.1 requires a finding that the defendant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice, citing United States v. Lofton as controlling law. The district court erred by not making such a mens rea finding. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, requiring proper findings as to Ho-Romero’s conscious purpose to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Ho-Romero" on Justia Law