Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Carrie Cotton was charged in four separate cases with multiple class A misdemeanor offenses, including stalking, harassment, and violating a disorderly conduct restraining order. The charges stemmed from her alleged harassment of her ex-boyfriend, T.B., and his acquaintances, H.C., B.C., and T.C., including sending numerous messages from various phone numbers and fake social media accounts. Despite a restraining order, Cotton continued to contact the victims with explicit and vulgar messages. She entered Alford pleas of guilty to all charges.The District Court of Foster County, Southeast Judicial District, presided by Judge James D. Hovey, sentenced Cotton to consecutive prison terms of 360 days on four separate counts, each relating to different victims and incidents. The court also imposed suspended terms of imprisonment on the remaining counts and ordered two years of probation. Cotton appealed, arguing that the consecutive sentences for misdemeanor offenses violated North Dakota’s statutory prohibition against such sentencing, claiming her actions constituted a single course of conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that an exception to the general rule against consecutive sentences for misdemeanors applied because each offense was committed as part of a different course of conduct, involving distinct acts against different victims on different dates. The court found that similarity in method and motive did not render the offenses part of the same course of conduct. The court also rejected Cotton’s argument that the district court failed to make necessary factual findings, concluding that the facts were undisputed and the legal standard was met. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended criminal judgments, holding that the consecutive sentences were lawful under the statutory exception. View "State v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Joseph Miller was charged in two separate criminal cases with aggravated assault and violations of a domestic violence protection order (DVPO). In one case, the charge for violating a DVPO was amended from a felony to a misdemeanor after a prior violation was dismissed. Miller entered an Alford plea to aggravated assault and pled guilty to the amended misdemeanor DVPO violation and a felony DVPO violation in the second case. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration and probation, with some time suspended and conditions including electronic monitoring and participation in sobriety and anger management programs.The District Court of Nelson County, Northeast Central Judicial District, presided over Miller’s cases. After Miller failed to comply with probation conditions—including repeated alcohol violations and failure to complete required programs—the State petitioned to revoke his probation. At the revocation hearing, Miller admitted to the remaining alleged violations. The district court found Miller violated probation, revoked it, and resentenced him. However, the court did not orally pronounce a new sentence for the misdemeanor DVPO violation in one case, and the amended judgment classified it as a felony, contrary to the earlier amendment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed Miller’s appeal, applying a two-step analysis for probation revocation: reviewing factual findings for clear error and the revocation decision for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court’s findings of probation violations were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, and that revocation and incarceration were not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation and sentence in the felony DVPO case, affirmed the findings and sentence for aggravated assault, but reversed and remanded for proper sentencing on the misdemeanor DVPO violation, as the sentence in the amended judgment was inconsistent with the oral pronouncement. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted by a jury in 2018 on two felony counts of gross sexual imposition involving the seven-year-old daughter of his girlfriend. The prosecution’s case included the child’s testimony, a video of her forensic interview, statements from her mother and babysitter, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct and statements before and after the alleged incident. The State also introduced evidence of the defendant’s internet searches for incest-related pornography, which was not referenced in closing arguments and comprised a small portion of the trial record.On direct appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the defendant’s counsel had failed to object to the admission of the internet search evidence under North Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b), and thus forfeited the issue. The defendant then sought postconviction relief in the District Court of Burleigh County, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the Rule 404(b) evidence and for not arguing obvious error on appeal. The district court granted relief, finding counsel’s performance deficient under the first prong of Strickland v. Washington and concluding, with minimal explanation, that the defendant was prejudiced under the second prong.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in finding counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. However, the Supreme Court found the district court’s analysis of prejudice insufficient, as it did not assess the impact of counsel’s errors in the context of the remaining evidence and the overall trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of deficient performance, reversed the finding of prejudice, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to supplement the record if possible and conduct the required prejudice analysis under Strickland. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with four federal sex-trafficking offenses involving two victims, one an adult and the other a minor. The defendant, who identified himself as a pimp, transported both victims from Atlanta to Miami in advance of the 2020 Super Bowl, intending for them to perform sex work. The adult victim testified that she was threatened and coerced into working for the defendant, while the minor victim, who was seventeen, did not testify at trial. Evidence included social media posts, communications between the defendant and the victims, and testimony about the defendant’s control over the victims. The minor victim was apprehended during a police sting operation in Miami, and her statements to police were admitted at trial despite her absence as a witness.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all four counts: sex trafficking of the adult victim by force and coercion, transporting the adult victim to engage in sexual activity, sex trafficking of the minor victim, and transporting the minor victim to engage in sexual activity. The defendant was sentenced to 300 months in prison and ten years of supervised release. He appealed, arguing that the admission of the minor victim’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules, that the jury instructions for two counts constructively amended the indictment, and that the evidence was insufficient for two counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the minor victim’s statements were nontestimonial and thus did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and that any hearsay error was harmless. The court found that while the jury instructions for two counts constructively amended the indictment, these errors did not amount to plain error. The court also concluded that sufficient evidence supported all convictions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "USA v. Carter" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, unlawful intercourse, and incest, all involving his 17-year-old immediate relative. The alleged incident occurred when the defendant stayed overnight at the victim’s home, entered her bedroom, and engaged in sexual acts without her consent. The victim testified about the charged incident and two prior uncharged incidents involving the defendant, one when she was eight years old and another a few weeks before the charged offenses. The defendant denied all wrongdoing and provided alternative explanations for his actions. The prosecution presented expert testimony on the psychology of child sexual assault victims and admitted evidence of the defendant’s statements during pretext phone calls.The Monterey County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison, with sentences for unlawful intercourse and incest stayed. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for some counts, improper jury instructions regarding the definition of force, erroneous admission of uncharged acts, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain evidence and testimony.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred by granting the prosecution’s request to modify the pattern jury instructions on the definition of force, which misled the jury regarding an essential element of the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation charges. This error was deemed prejudicial, requiring reversal and remand for possible retrial on those counts. The court found sufficient evidence supported the convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest, and that other asserted errors were either harmless or did not constitute ineffective assistance. The convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest were affirmed, while the convictions for forcible rape and forcible oral copulation were reversed and remanded. View "P. v. Melgoza" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of murdering his estranged wife by shooting her in the back seat of a car outside a police station, in the presence of children. He was arrested the day before the murder for domestic violence, released on bond, and the next day followed his wife and her friend to the police station, where the shooting occurred. The prosecution presented evidence of prior domestic abuse and a previous conviction for a violent offense. The defense focused on the defendant’s troubled upbringing, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits. The jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The PCR court initially denied relief in an order that was identical to the State’s proposed order. The Supreme Court of South Carolina vacated that order and remanded for a new order with specific findings. On remand, the PCR court again denied relief, issuing an amended order after reviewing the parties’ proposed orders and making some corrections. The defendant’s requests for a new hearing or for the judge’s recusal were denied.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred by adopting the State’s proposed order and whether trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and presenting mitigation. The court held that the PCR court did not violate the defendant’s rights by adopting the State’s proposed order after adequate review, and that any deficiencies in trial counsel’s mitigation investigation or presentation did not prejudice the defendant. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigation evidence would have changed the jury’s recommendation. The decision of the PCR court was affirmed in result. View "Lindsey v. The State" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felonies and a misdemeanor after breaking into an airport hangar, causing over $1 million in property damage to the hangar, an airplane, and vehicles, and stealing an ATV. He had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for theft, burglary, and other offenses. He entered an open guilty plea to all charges. The district court sentenced him to consecutive terms totaling 51 years in prison, 3 years of probation, and ordered restitution of $306,400, reflecting damages not covered by insurance.After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, arguing his sentence was illegal and seeking leniency. The District Court of Pierce County partially granted the motion, finding the sentence was not illegal but reducing the total imprisonment to 30 years as an act of leniency. The defendant appealed from the order denying further relief and from the amended judgment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as the sentence was within statutory limits and justified by the gravity of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also found no violation of statutory law regarding mandatory minimum sentences, as none of the offenses required such minimums and the consecutive sentences were authorized by law. The court declined to address additional arguments regarding judicial conduct and equal protection, finding they were not adequately raised or supported. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order and the amended judgment. View "State v. Wallette" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted after pleading guilty to several offenses, including aggravated assault, terrorizing, felonious restraint, child neglect, and domestic violence. He was sentenced to jail time and placed on probation for two years, with conditions that included abstaining from drugs and alcohol and not violating any laws. The State later petitioned to revoke his probation, alleging that he had used controlled substances, been charged with new crimes, and pled guilty to additional offenses.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, held a probation revocation hearing. During the hearing, the defendant indicated he had applied for counsel but had not received a response. The court offered to continue the hearing and provide another application for counsel, especially after the State indicated it would recommend a significant sentence. The defendant, however, repeatedly stated he wished to proceed without counsel, and the court confirmed multiple times that he understood his right to counsel and was waiving it voluntarily. The State withdrew one allegation, and the defendant admitted to the remaining two. The court found he violated probation and resentenced him to five years, with certain sentences to run concurrently and others consecutively.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant argued that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the revocation hearing. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing in North Dakota arises from a rule of criminal procedure, not the Constitution, and that the district court’s finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended criminal judgment revoking probation and resentencing the defendant. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A prisoner who was serving a sentence for multiple felony offenses believed that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had miscalculated the length of his prison term. Initially, the department determined his sentence to be 11 years, but before his anticipated release, it recalculated the sentence as 13 years. After his original release date passed, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his maximum sentence had expired and he was being unlawfully held. The trial court found the sentencing entry ambiguous regarding the sentence length, resolved the ambiguity in the prisoner’s favor, and ordered his immediate release.The warden requested a stay of the trial court’s order, which was denied. The warden then appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals and again sought a stay, but the appellate court denied the request due to a procedural deficiency. Without addressing the merits of the appeal, the Ninth District dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that the prisoner’s release and the warden’s failure to secure a stay rendered the appeal moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the prisoner’s release rendered the warden’s appeal moot. The court held that the appeal was not moot because, if the warden prevailed, the prisoner could be returned to custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. The court explained that an actual controversy remained, as effective relief could still be granted. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the warden’s appeal. View "Maurent v. Spatny" on Justia Law

Mark French, representing himself, was convicted of a misdemeanor in the Sanders County Justice Court, which is not a court of record. He appealed the conviction to the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. After Judge John W. Larson assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, French moved to disqualify him, citing perceived injustices related to the rescheduling of the trial. When that motion was denied, French filed an alternative motion for substitution of judge under Montana law.The Montana Supreme Court previously denied French’s motion to disqualify Judge Larson, finding the issue moot because the trial date had been vacated. The Supreme Court also clarified that Judge Larson had jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of French’s subsequent motion for substitution. Judge Larson then denied French’s motion for substitution, relying on precedent from D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, which addressed substitution in a different context. French then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for supervisory control, arguing that his substitution motion was timely and authorized, that his right to a jury trial was denied, and that the District Court improperly relied on the Justice Court record.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that, when a criminal case is appealed from a justice court that is not a court of record for a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to one substitution of a district judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, as if the case had originated in district court. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of French’s motion for substitution and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also found that the Justice Court record was properly transferred and relied upon. French’s request for dismissal of the District Court proceeding was denied. View "French v. 20th Judicial District" on Justia Law