Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Thiago de Souza Prado was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The scheme involved defrauding rideshare and food delivery companies by creating and using fraudulent accounts, and misappropriating the identities of third parties. Prado, who was ineligible to drive for these companies due to numerous driving infractions and his unauthorized status in the U.S., initially used fraudulent accounts created by others and later began creating and renting out his own fraudulent accounts. He obtained driver's license images and Social Security numbers from various sources, including associates and the dark web, and used software to spoof GPS information to inflate driver fees and generate fake referral rewards.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Prado to seventy months in prison. Prado appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. He argued that he was prejudiced by an amendment to the third superseding indictment during trial and by the district court's refusal to disqualify the prosecution team. He also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no error in the district court's decision to allow the amendment of the indictment, as it did not alter the substance of the charges. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the wall separating Levy, a former defense attorney who joined the U.S. Attorney's Office, from the prosecution team had not been breached. Additionally, the court determined that any potential errors in calculating loss and Prado's criminal history were harmless, as the district court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless.The First Circuit affirmed Prado's convictions and sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Prado's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. De Souza Prado" on Justia Law

Carlos Reyes-Rosario was convicted of five federal offenses related to a drug trafficking conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The indictment charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a protected location, and possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana within 1,000 feet of a protected location. He was also charged with possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime but was acquitted of this charge. Reyes was sentenced to concurrent terms of 168 months for four counts and 120 months for one count.Reyes filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions, particularly for Count Two, which involved aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin. The District Court denied his motion, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him based on his involvement in the conspiracy and the actions of his co-conspirators under the Pinkerton doctrine. Reyes appealed, challenging the denial of his motion for acquittal, the admission of certain evidence, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the evidence presented at trial, including testimony and video recordings, was sufficient to support Reyes's conviction under the Pinkerton doctrine. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the video and items seized during the search, as they were properly authenticated by a cooperating witness. Additionally, the court rejected Reyes's Confrontation Clause challenges, noting that he had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness about relevant topics.The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings, including the denial of Reyes's motion for acquittal and the admission of evidence. The court also found Reyes's sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the District Court had adequately considered the relevant factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Reyes-Rosario" on Justia Law

Derek Capozzi was convicted in 1999 on three counts: possession of a firearm as a felon, attempted extortion, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, resulting in a 360-month sentence. Capozzi's direct appeal was unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. In 2005, Capozzi filed his first motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his prior convictions should not count as ACCA predicates. The district court denied the motion, finding that the presentence report indicated his prior convictions involved buildings, qualifying them as ACCA predicates.In 2015, Capozzi sought permission to file a second § 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. The district court granted the motion in part, vacating his firearm-in-furtherance conviction but denying his Johnson II claim, reasoning that the ACCA enhancement was not based solely on the residual clause. Capozzi appealed, arguing that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his Johnson II claim and that it erred in not conducting a resentencing hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Capozzi could not establish a Johnson II claim because his sentence was not based solely on the residual clause. The court found that the district court had relied on the enumerated clause, which was not invalidated by Johnson II. Consequently, Capozzi's claim was time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in opting to correct Capozzi's sentence without conducting a de novo resentencing. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and abetting the same, following a home invasion, robbery, and brutal physical attack on a 77-year-old woman who died nine days later. The advisory guideline sentencing range was up to fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged that an upward variance was warranted due to the victim's death. At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year sentence, while the government requested sixteen years.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico did not accept either recommendation. Instead, it considered a higher advisory guideline range based on the first-degree murder cross-reference, which would have recommended a life sentence, reduced to twenty-five years due to the statutory maximum. However, the court did not apply this cross-reference, citing insufficient causation evidence and the belief that a twenty-five-year sentence was too harsh given Martínez-Ramos's youth. The court imposed an eighteen-year sentence, a substantial upward variance from the guideline range, due to the physical attack contributing to the victim's death.Martínez-Ramos appealed, arguing that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable and that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez-Ramos had acknowledged the victim's death as a factor in his plea agreement and that the autopsy listed facial and bodily trauma as contributory factors to the death. The court concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the eighteen-year sentence. View "United States v. Martinez-Ramos" on Justia Law

Deangelus Thomas was indicted on two counts of being a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for his involvement in a shooting. Although his indictment indicated potential enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, he was not formally indicted as an armed career criminal. A jury found him guilty of both counts. During sentencing, Thomas argued that he could not be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had not been indicted for it, and the jury had not found that he had three prior violent-felony convictions committed on different occasions. The district judge disagreed and imposed an enhanced 432-month sentence based on Thomas's criminal history.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis followed then-binding Sixth Circuit precedent, which allowed the judge to find the necessary facts for the ACCA enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. Thomas appealed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. However, the Supreme Court later decided Erlinger v. United States, which required a jury to find the three-occasions element of an ACCA conviction. The Supreme Court remanded Thomas's case for further consideration in light of Erlinger.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Erlinger errors are subject to harmless-error review. The court found that the error in Thomas's case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the Shepard documents and the Presentence Report provided clear evidence that Thomas's three prior violent felonies occurred on different occasions. The court also rejected Thomas's double jeopardy argument, concluding that the enhanced sentence did not violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Thomas's enhanced sentence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Rashun Suncar was convicted of distributing fentanyl and challenged the application of a career offender enhancement to his sentence. This enhancement was based on two prior Pennsylvania state convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. Suncar argued that the Pennsylvania statute criminalizes offers to sell and attempted transfers of drugs, making it broader than the federal guidelines' definition of a controlled substance offense.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia applied the career offender enhancement, referencing the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Dawson, which held that the Pennsylvania statute was an appropriate predicate for a career offender finding. The district court imposed a sentence of 92 months, noting that it would impose the same sentence even if the guideline determination was found incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Suncar's argument that the Pennsylvania statute includes offers to sell, noting that the statute's language does not support this interpretation. The court also found that the statute's criminalization of attempted transfers does not make it overbroad, as an attempted transfer is considered a completed delivery under federal law and analogous state statutes. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the Pennsylvania statute is not categorically overbroad compared to the federal guidelines. View "United States v. Suncar" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The key evidence against him included two recorded police interviews with Daequan Carr, the state's primary witness, who identified the defendant as the shooter. Carr was uncooperative at trial, leading the prosecution to introduce his prior statements under the Whelan rule, which allows prior inconsistent statements to be used substantively if certain conditions are met.The trial court admitted Carr's interviews, finding his trial testimony inconsistent with his prior statements. Carr's father, Dennis Cobia, also made statements during one interview, which the court allowed to the extent Carr adopted them. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison.The defendant appealed, arguing that Carr's trial testimony was not inconsistent with his prior statements and that the trial court erred in admitting Cobia's statements. He also contended that the court improperly admitted a Facebook photo and Snapchat video showing him with items similar to those used in the crime.The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Carr's interviews. Carr's ambiguous statements about his recollection did not clearly establish inconsistency, and the prosecution did not sufficiently probe his memory or attempt to refresh it. The court also failed to adequately determine whether Carr refused to testify. The error was not harmless, as Carr's identification of the defendant was crucial, and no other evidence directly linked the defendant to the crime.The court clarified that adopted statements could be admitted under Whelan if unequivocally adopted by the witness. However, the trial court improperly delegated to the jury the task of determining which of Cobia's statements were adopted by Carr. The court upheld the admission of the Facebook photo and Snapchat video, finding their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder after fatally stabbing his girlfriend in their shared apartment. The incident occurred while the victim’s son was home, though he did not witness the attack. After the killing, the defendant fled in the victim’s car and communicated with family members via Facebook, making statements about the altercation and his intent to leave the country. He was later apprehended in New York, where he made statements to police both spontaneously and during a subsequent interview, in which he confessed to the killing. During the police interview, photographs were taken of the defendant to document any injuries.In the Superior Court for the judicial district of Waterbury, the defendant moved to suppress his statement to the Waterbury police, arguing it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel under Miranda and Edwards. The trial court agreed in part, suppressing the statement from the prosecution’s case-in-chief but allowing its use for impeachment if the defendant testified, relying on State v. Reid. The court also admitted photographs taken of the defendant, finding they were obtained through standard police procedure and not as a result of the Miranda violation. Additionally, the court permitted the late disclosure of a witness, the victim’s sister-in-law, after finding no prejudice to the defense.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It held that the state constitution does not prohibit the use of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, declining to overrule State v. Reid. The court also held that the photographs were admissible because they had an independent source in routine police procedure. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion or violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial in allowing the late-disclosed witness to testify, as the defendant suffered no demonstrable prejudice. View "State v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal stabbing that occurred during a confrontation inside the victim’s apartment. The defendant and the victim were both acquainted with a woman named Menendez, who had relationships with both men. In the period leading up to the incident, the defendant became increasingly controlling and jealous regarding Menendez’s interactions with the victim. On the day of the stabbing, Menendez was staying with the victim, and after a series of tense interactions and text messages, the defendant arrived at the victim’s apartment. Shortly after the defendant’s arrival, a violent altercation ensued, resulting in the victim being stabbed in the chest and later dying from his injuries. The defendant admitted to stabbing the victim but claimed he acted in self-defense, asserting that the victim attacked him with a knife first.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford. At trial, the state presented testimony from Menendez, a medical examiner, a detective, and an inmate who had shared a cell with the defendant. The state’s evidence included testimony that contradicted the defendant’s account, suggesting that the defendant brought the knife to the apartment and was the only person armed during the struggle. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, rejecting his self-defense claim. The defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years of incarceration and appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant either did not actually believe he was in imminent danger of deadly physical force or, if he did, that such a belief was not objectively reasonable. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the state met its burden of disproving the defendant’s justification defense. View "State v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 26, 2018, David Page was shot and killed while picking up acquaintances at 100 Lowell Avenue. The Providence Police Department (PPD) responded and found Mr. Page unresponsive in his car. Surveillance footage showed a black vehicle near the scene. On July 2, 2018, during unrelated investigations, police found a black Audi linked to Kennedy Terrero. Further investigation connected this Audi to the shooting. Terrero, under a cooperation agreement, testified against Jaythan Hang and Chandanoeuth Hay, implicating them in the shooting.The Superior Court jury found Hang guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy, felony assault, and firearms offenses. Hang appealed, arguing the trial justice erred in several pretrial and trial rulings, including denying a motion for severance, admitting evidence of prior bad acts, admitting statements against interest, and allowing lay opinion testimony. He also challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy count.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's decisions. The court held that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible to show motive and intent, and the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting the corroborative evidence and testimony presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Hang" on Justia Law