Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two environmental organizations challenged a July 2020 Final Environmental Assessment (EA) and Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) issued by Wildlife Services, an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The EA and FONSI authorized a predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas in Nevada. The plaintiffs argued that the program violated the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Services. The court concluded that predator control in Wilderness Areas to support pre-existing grazing operations was permissible under the Wilderness Act. The court also found that the agency's statewide analysis of the environmental impacts was reasonable and that the agency had adequately considered the potential impacts on public health, Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty regarding lethal predator damage management (PDM).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim, holding that lethal PDM is permissible in Wilderness Areas when conducted in support of pre-existing grazing operations. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The court found that the EA failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental impacts, particularly regarding the geographic scope of the PDM program, the potential impacts on public health, the unique characteristics of Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty surrounding lethal PDM. The court remanded the case to the district court to direct the agency to reconsider whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required and to produce either a revised EA or an EIS. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION WILDLIFE SERVICES" on Justia Law

Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.In the lower court, the CIT granted the government's motion to dismiss Target's challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs' errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs' liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT's interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts. View "TARGET CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Dr. Blake Vanderlan, a physician at a hospital operated by Jackson HMA, LLC, alleged that the hospital systematically violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). He reported these violations to the Department of Health and Human Services, prompting an investigation by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS confirmed the violations and referred the matter to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for potential civil monetary penalties. Vanderlan then filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Jackson HMA, alleging five FCA violations, including a retaliation claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi handled the case initially. The government investigated Vanderlan’s claims but declined to intervene. The case continued for six and a half years, during which the district court severed Vanderlan’s retaliation claims. The government eventually moved to dismiss the qui tam claims, arguing that the lawsuit interfered with administrative settlement negotiations and lacked merit. The district court granted the dismissal based on written filings and reaffirmed its decision after reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying Vanderlan an evidentiary hearing, as the FCA only requires a hearing on the briefs. The court also determined that the government’s motion to dismiss fell under Rule 41(a)(1), which allows for dismissal without a court order, and thus, the district court had no discretion to deny the dismissal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the government’s decision to dismiss the case was justified and that the district court applied the correct standard. View "Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA" on Justia Law

Fahmi Ahmed Moharam, a dual United States-Yemeni citizen, frequently travels between the two countries. In 2017, he was denied boarding a flight from Saudi Arabia to the U.S. and learned through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) redress process that he was on the No Fly List. The government provided minimal information, citing national security concerns, and stated that his designation was based on his activities in Yemen from 2011 to 2017. After petitioning for review, the government informed him that he was no longer on the No Fly List and would not be relisted based on the currently available information.The TSA is mandated by statute to identify individuals who may pose a threat to civil aviation or national security and prevent them from boarding aircraft. The TSA also manages the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), which allows individuals to appeal their inclusion on the No Fly List. Moharam appealed through TRIP and was initially informed that he was on the list due to concerns about his activities in Yemen. Despite his requests for more information and administrative review, the TSA maintained his status on the list until the government later removed him.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Moharam's removal from the No Fly List rendered his petitions for review moot, as the court could no longer provide effective relief. The court noted that the government’s assurance that Moharam would not be relisted based on the same information addressed the issue of potential recurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, as the relief sought was no longer redressable. View "Moharam v. TSA" on Justia Law

Roxann Brown and Michelle Smith filed a lawsuit against Old Navy, alleging that the retailer sent them e-mails with subject lines containing false or misleading information about the duration of promotions, in violation of the "Commercial Electronic Mail Act" (CEMA). The plaintiffs claimed that Old Navy's e-mails falsely suggested that promotions were ending or were limited-time offers, which were extended beyond the specified time limits.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case and certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of RCW 19.190.020(1)(b). The federal court sought clarification on whether the statute prohibits any false or misleading information in the subject lines of commercial e-mails or only false or misleading information about the commercial nature of the message.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the certified question de novo and concluded that RCW 19.190.020(1)(b) prohibits the use of any false or misleading information in the subject line of a commercial e-mail, not just information about the commercial nature of the message. The court emphasized that the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, and it does not require judicial construction. The court also noted that the statute's focus on subject lines is appropriate and does not lead to absurd results. The court held that mere puffery, which includes subjective statements, opinions, and hyperbole, is not prohibited by the statute. The court's decision clarifies that commercial e-mails sent to Washington residents must have truthful and non-misleading subject lines. View "Brown v. Old Navy, LLC" on Justia Law

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law, alleging they arrested him without probable cause. He also brought federal and state claims against the City of Newton, Iowa. The district court denied summary judgment in part, determining that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondeat superior claim against the City predicated on Galanakis’s false arrest claim. The defendants appealed, arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity protected the officers—and, as to the false arrest claim, the City—from suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim, concluding that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under the influence of marijuana. The court found that Galanakis evinced almost no indicia of intoxication and that his behavior during the stop did not suggest impairment. The court also dismissed the interlocutory appeal as to the state-law claims, noting that without clarification that resolution of the qualified immunity claim necessarily resolves the pendent claims, it declined to exercise jurisdiction. View "Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa" on Justia Law

The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law